文章基本信息

标题：QUALITY MEASUREMENT AND RISK-SHARING IN CONTRACTS FOR CALIFORNIA FRUITS AND VEGETABLES
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作者：Hueth, Brent ; Ligon, Ethan
期刊名称：Journal of Food Distribution Research
印刷版ISSN：0047-245X
出版年度：1998
期号：SUPPL
出版社：Food Distribution Research Society
摘要：The produce industry collectively solves an extremely complicated resource allocationproblem in which risk-averse farmers grow a product whose market price is often quite unpre-dictable. Shippers or other intermediaries shield the farmer from much of this risk, permittingfairly e.cient production. However, actual contracts between growers and shippers vary consid-erably across commodities in the residual price risk growers face. We hypothesize that imperfectquality measurement results in a moral hazard problem, and that idiosyncratic variation in theprice of the produce provides additional information regarding quality. As a consequence, an ef-ficient contract does not shield growers from all price risk. We examine this hypothesis for thecase of fresh-market and processing tomatoes, and conclude that unobserved quality is capable ofexplaining observed variation in the price risk tomato growers face.