文章基本信息

标题：A Reconstruction of James's Normative Ethics
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作者：Todd Lekan
期刊名称：William James Studies
电子版ISSN：1933-8295
出版年度：2012
卷号：9
页码：144-168
出版社：Illinois University Press
摘要：William James wrote only one systematic essay on ethics: "The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life" (hereafter, MPML)1. Yet that one essay is arguably the best early statement of pragmatic ethics by any philosopher. It is also highly suggestive, much of its argument structure presupposed as scaffolding the reader must reconstruct. My aim in this paper is to expose what I regard as a key, overlooked, aspect of that scaffolding that makes sense of the relationship between James'smeta-ethics and normative ethics.2James'smeta-ethics is, at first glance subjectivist and pluralist. Values only exist as objects of demands. There is no one object demanded by all sentient beings. Therefore, value pluralism is true—there are as many values as there are demands. His normative ethics is based on an inclusivity principle that enjoins us to maximize the satisfaction of as many demands as possible. This principle coheres with other related claims that James makes about the moral life including the importance of sympathetic tolerance for alien ideals and a fallibilistic humility about what actions, practices, and institutions promote demand satisfaction.3