文章基本信息

标题：Theft and Welfare in General Equilibrium: A Theoretical Note
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作者：Thomas Randolph Beard ; George S. Ford ; Liliana V. Stern 等
期刊名称：Theoretical Economics Letters
印刷版ISSN：2162-2078
电子版ISSN：2162-2086
出版年度：2012
卷号：2
期号：5
页码：470-473
DOI：10.4236/tel.2012.25088
出版社：Scientific Research Publishing
摘要：We show that in a dynamic general equilibrium model theft lowers social welfare even if it is costless to steal, there is no theft prevention cost, and all stolen goods are immediately returned to society. Theft lowers social welfare because it distorts the investment decision, resulting in undercapitalization and a lower steady-state level of capital. This sheds a new light on the literature originated by Tullock [1].
关键词：General Equilibrium; Theft; Efficiency