文章基本信息

标题：Endogenous Sunk Cost, Quality Competition and Welfare
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作者：George S. Ford ; Michael Stern
期刊名称：Theoretical Economics Letters
印刷版ISSN：2162-2078
电子版ISSN：2162-2086
出版年度：2011
卷号：1
期号：3
页码：88-90
DOI：10.4236/tel.2011.13018
出版社：Scientific Research Publishing
摘要：Competition in quality with escalating levels of endogenous sunk costs may produce levels of concentration even higher than expected in their absence. We show that consumers may very well benefit from such expenditures despite the effects on concentration and likely attenuation of price competition.
关键词：Sunk Costs; Endogenous Sunk Costs; Quality Competition; Welfare; Market Structure