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标题：Hugo Grotius, Moral Scepticism and the use of arguments in Utramque partem
本地全文：下载
作者：Marcelo de Araujo
期刊名称：Veritas
印刷版ISSN：0042-3955
出版年度：2011
卷号：56
期号：03
出版社：Faculdade de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas, Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio Grande do Sul
摘要：The use of equally compelling arguments both for and against the truth of a proposition were known in the Renaissance as arguments in utramque partem. Early modern sceptics used arguments in utramque partem in order to show that one cannot ground morality on safe grounds, for the arguments which are presented in favor of the idea of justice could be neutralized by equally compelling arguments against the idea of justice. In this paper, I argue that Hugo Grotius tried to refute this kind of moral scepticism in his main philosophical writings, De jure bellic ac pacis and De jure praedae commentarius. Against the sceptic, Grotius seeks to establish that the reasons which are consecutively presented for and against the idea of justice are not incompatible with each other.
关键词：Hugo Grotius. Moral. Ceticismo. Justiça.