期刊名称：Discussion Paper Series / Department of Economics, New York University
出版年度：2008
卷号：1
出版社：New York University
摘要：We study an optimal collusion-proof auction in an environment
where subsets of bidders may collude not just on their bids but
also on their participation. Despite their ability to collude on participation,
informational asymmetry facing the potential colluders can be
exploited significantly to weaken their collusive power. The second-best
auction ¡ª i.e., the optimal auction in a collusion-free environment ¡ª
can be made collusion-proof, if at least one bidder is not collusive, or
there are multiple bidding cartels, or the second-best outcome involves
a nontrivial probability of the object not being sold. In case the secondbest
outcome is not weak collusion-proof implementable, we characterize
an optimal collusion-proof auction. This auction involves nontrivial exclusion
of collusive bidders ¡ª i.e., the object is not sold to any collusive
bidder with positive probability.
关键词：Collusion on participation, subgroup collusion, multiple
bidding cartels, an exclusion principle.
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