期刊名称：Discussion Paper Series / Department of Economics, New York University
出版年度：2007
卷号：1
出版社：New York University
摘要：This paper considers settlement negotiations between a single
defendant and N plaintiffs when there are fixed costs of litigation. When
making simultaneous take-it-or-leave-it offers to the plaintiffs, the defendant
adopts a divide and conquer strategy. Plaintiffs settle their claims for less
than they are jointly worth. The problem is worse when N is larger, the
offers are sequential, and the plaintiffs make offers instead. Although divide
and conquer strategies dilute the defendant¡¯s incentives, they increase the
settlement rate and reduce litigation spending. Plaintiffs can raise their
joint payoff through transfer payments, voting rules, and covenants not to
accept discriminatory offers.(JEL: K4, C7, D8)
关键词：litigation, settlement, class actions, bargaining, divide and conquer,
contracting with externalities
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