摘要：During the last couple of decades, there has been a large litera-
ture discussing how the properties of emission taxes are a¤ected by
the existence of distortionary taxes. Most of this literature ignores
distributional aspects of environmental taxes and other types of envi-
ronmental policy instruments.The present paper considers a very sim-
ple model with heterogeneous households, di¤ering in income earning
ability. The tax system is not necessarily fully optimal. Instead, a tax
function is assumed to be exogenously given, but the parameters of
this tax function are optimally chosen. The rule for the second-best
optimal environmental tax is derived and compared with the Pigovian
rule. The results derived in the present paper are related to the re-
sults from the literature on public goods provision under distortionary
taxes.
关键词：environmental taxes, public goods, distortionay tax-
ation
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