摘要:U.S. bank supervisors conduct comprehensive inspections of bank holding
companies and assign them a supervisory rating, known as a BOPEC rating prior to
2005, meant to summarize their overall condition. We develop an empirical model
of these BOPEC ratings that combines supervisory and securities market
information. Securities market variables, such as stock returns and bond yield
spreads, improve the model's in-sample fit. Debt market variables provide more
information on supervisory ratings for banks closer to default, while equity
market variables provide useful information on ratings for banks further from
default. The out-of-sample accuracy of the model with securities market
variables is little different from that of a model based on supervisory
variables alone. However, the model with securities market information
identifies additional ratings downgrades, which are of particular importance to
bank supervisors who are concerned with systemic risk and contagion.