文章基本信息

标题：Trust, Communication and Contracts: Experimental Evidence
本地全文：下载
作者：Avner Ben-Ner ; Louis Putterman
期刊名称：Economics Working Papers / Brown University
出版年度：2006
卷号：2006
出版社：Brown University
摘要：We introduce opportunities for pre-play communication and to enter binding or non-binding contracts in trust games, and find (a) communication increases trusting and trustworthiness, (b) contracts are unnecessary for trusting and trustworthy behaviors and are eschewed by many players, (c) more trusting leads to higher earnings, and (d) both trustors and trustees favor ¡°fair and efficient¡± proposals over the unequal proposals predicted by theory.
关键词：trust game, trust, trustworthiness, reciprocity, commitment, communication.