‘Good’ and ‘evil’ are often regarded as the most general, and at the same
time universal categories that shape human moralities and ethical
theories. Islamic ethics is no exception. The Quran uses the concepts of
khayr (good) and sharr (evil) to denote what the world as a whole with its
various parts and events taking place in it can bring to the human being.
‘Good’ and ‘evil’ as philosophical categories were elaborated in
Mu‘tazilism and later in Sufism along the lines generally adopted in
Islamic ethics. As for the falasifa, they were largely dependant on
Aristotelian and, even more, Neoplatonic view on good and evil.
Although the Mu‘tazilites and the S.ufis proceed from the intuitions of the
Quran, their theories differ from it in at least one respect. Quran regards
good and evil as relative categories. Something is evil not because it
participates in an evil principle, but because its ‘bad’ effects are
overweighing the ‘good’ ones. Fiqh adopts the same basis for prohibiting
and sanctioning, and therefore the prohibited may easily be not only
sanctioned ad hoc but even prescribed as obligatory if its ‘good’ effect
prevails over the ‘evil’ one in a given situation. As for the Mu‘tazilites,
they strive to treat good and evil as consistently non-relative categories,
claiming at the same time that the outcome and the meaning of the Divine
actions is only ‘good’ and never ‘evil,’ e.g., they argue that the
punishment of sinners is not an ‘evil’ for them but a manifestation of
God’s ‘concern’ about their fate resulting out of His ‘benevolence.’
Sufism can be treated as an interpreter of this Islamic legacy, as it
proceeds along the line of non-relative philosophical approach to the good
and evil. Ethical theories of Rumi and Ibn ‘Arabi, the two prominent S.ufi
thinkers, appear at the first glance to be opposite. They seemingly may be
qualified as ‘ethical dualism’ on the part of Rumi (he accepts the
dichotomy of good and evil which are sharply distinct and immiscible
principles) vs. ‘ethical monism’ on the part of Ibn ‘Arabi (whose basic
assumption resulting out of his ontologism is ‘all is good’). This
qualification seems to be confirmed by these authors’ elaboration of
traditional ethical topics like love (‘ishq) and beloved (ma‘shuq),
temptation (fitna), thankfulness (shukr), patience (s.abr) and complaint
(shakwa), autonomy of human will (ikhtiyar) and action (fi‘l), attitude
towards other religions. However, I will argue that this opposition is not
as sharp as it might appear after the comparison of the relevant texts.
Epistemological theory which Ibn ‘Arabi calls ‘perplexity’ (h.ayra) treats
the truth as an entwinement of the two opposites that would ordinarily be
considered mutually exclusive. Therefore his ethical monism does not
rule out dualism, but on the contrary presupposes it according to the
strategy of the ‘perplexed’ (h.a’ir) reasoning. Rumi moves from the other
end, as his dualistic theses develop into discourse which leads him to
what at least logically is compatible with ethical monism.