Objections to These Unions

Jonathan Ranch ("Objections to These Unions," June) eloquently addresses the conflict between the natural evolution of institutions and their fairness. Although he notes the importance of the separation of church and state as an argument for not relying on a religious definition of marriage, he does not follow its logic to a different sort of resolution: no state involvement in marriage at all.

Before the recent ruling by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, one might reasonably have predicted that over time states would adopt Vermont-type civil union options for same-sex couples seeking marriage. Such unions would provide for common property, inheritance, next-of-kin status in medical care decisions, and the other legal benefits conferred by a state-recognized marriage. Advocates of same-sex marriage generally see the differential labeling as discriminatory--a "separate but equal" solution that speaks inequality. The court's rejection of this evolutionary solution, however, is forcing a constitutional battle over the marriage label. A resolution consistent with liberal principles is for states to forgo bestowing the label altogether: Let states provide civil union and others in civil society bless, recognize, or proclaim civil unions as marriages in accordance with their own values.

A liberal resolution sees the legal fights of marriage as being in the state sphere and the proper interpretation of the institution of marriage as being in the private sphere. Its implementation requires that state constitutions abolish the term marriage altogether, replacing it with civil union. Religions, gay rights groups, and other organizations would then be free to recognize all or some civil unions as they see fit. The state would provide equality under the law and people would be free to express their belief about the morality of same-sex marriage through flee association.

David L. Weimer

Department of Political Science

University of Wisconsin-Madison

Madison, WI

There are places where Hayek is even less conservative, and more liberal, than those passages cited by Jonathan Rauch. For instance, in "The Creative Powers of a Free Civilization," Hayek states, "We must recognize that even what we regard as good or beautiful is changeable, if not in any recognizable manner that could entitle us to take any kind of relativist position, yet in the sense that in many ways we do not know what will appear as good or beautiful to another generation."

Throughout this essay, Hayek makes the case for a wide-open social freedom based on the evolution of group mores. In this Hayekian universe, if there is a group that supports gay marriage, and if that group survives, then it is good. There is nothing in Hayek against subgroups advocating even radical social change. He is simply against government's forcing such changes.

In an ideal Hayekian world, there could be voluntaristic political entities that experimented with gay marriage and more controversial social changes. Perhaps state-level, as opposed to federal, decision making on such issues is the closest we can get at present.

Michael Strong

Angel Fire, NM

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