Should the U.S. weaponize space? - National Affairs

CONTROL OF SPACE is at the crux of the debate about the future of American military policy. The question is not about militarizing space. Clearly, the U.S. has been using and will continue to use space for military purposes. However, whereas space assets are currently used to support terrestrial (ground, sea, and air) military operations, what Sen. Robert C. Smith (R.-N.H.), the Space Commission (which was chaired by current Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld), and others have proposed is that the U.S. move toward "weaponizing" space.

There are those who feel the U.S. is currently at risk and should act now to seize the military high ground in space. Smith believes that "control of space is more than a new mission area--it is our moral legacy, our next Manifest Destiny, our chance to create security for centuries to come." The Space Commission argues that "space is not simply a place from which information is acquired and transmitted or through which objects pass," and "the U.S. must have the capabilities to defend its space assets against hostile acts and to negate the hostile use of space against U.S. interests."

Critics of such a policy shift are concerned that weaponizing space could trigger a dangerous arms race. They are quick to point out that no country currently has weapons in space and that an American move to deploy them (either offensive or defensive) would only provide unneeded impetus for other nations to follow suit.

Jonathan Pike of Globalsecurity.org contends that weaponizing space "runs fundamentally against the main theme of our space policy for the last half-century--to demonstrate America's power in space in a nonthreatening way." Air Force Lt. Col. Peter Hays and Karl Mueller (both faculty members at the School of Advanced Airpower Studies) argue that "it is no longer clear that the relationship between space and national security is, or should be, shaped primarily by international military competition."

Is there truly a clear and present danger in space? Is becoming more militarily active in space the next logical step? The Space Commission's rationale for U.S. vulnerability in space is relatively straightforward:

* The U.S. is more dependent on space than any other nation.

* The American military is increasingly dependent on space systems.

* U.S. security and economic well-being depend on its ability to operate successfully in space.

* Nations hostile to the U.S. either possess or can acquire the means to destroy American space systems.

* U.S. space systems are vulnerable to a range of attacks.

Accordingly, the Space Commission warns that Washington has not paid sufficient attention to the threat and, as a result, "the U.S. is an attractive candidate for a `Space Pearl Harbor.'"

It is indeed true that the U.S. is more dependent on space than are other countries and that the American military in particular is becoming increasingly dependent on space systems. Furthermore, space systems are currently undefended and, therefore, potentially vulnerable to attack. It does not necessarily follow, though, that the U.S. will suffer a "Space Pearl Harbor."

The more immediate threat is not against satellites in space, but to the land-based facilities (launch and ground-control) associated with space systems. Indeed, the Space Commission and others recognize that it will be significantly easier for a hostile adversary to threaten ground elements. Those elements could be susceptible to a variety of actions, including direct military assault (e.g., with aircraft missiles), terrorist attacks, sabotage, and jamming. Since this is a more-likely and less-expensive way to disable satellite capability, the primary focus should not be on protecting satellites in space, but on increasing security and defenses for satellite ground stations and mitigating jamming by the use of encryption, antijamming equipment, and "frequency hopping," which avoids interference from jamming on a particular frequency by switching to a new one after transmitting or receiving a packet of data. When this method is employed, the signal can be effectively jammed only if the jammer knows the frequencies being used, the time during which they are being utilized, and the sequence of use--not easy information to come by. The signal is more resistant to jamming the faster the hops between frequencies and the shorter the information packets.

The potential vulnerability of satellites themselves must be assessed in light of the fact that there is no current operational antisatellite (ASAT) threat. Thus, although U.S. satellites--both military and commercial--might be vulnerable to ASATs, the threat posed by them is postulated, rather than real. Moreover, the postulated threat--rudimentary ballistic missile capability, such as a Scud missile, mated to a low-yield nuclear weapon which would be detonated in low-Earth orbit and destroy satellite electronics with electromagnetic pulse from a nuclear blast--does not mean that potentially hostile countries have operational ASATs. It means, instead, that they might have a nuclear weapons capability or the ability to launch a payload into a low-Earth orbit. It does not mean that they have mated those two capabilities to develop and deploy an ASAT weapon.

Furthermore, this postulated ASAT threat is nuclear. If such a nuclear detonation were to occur, even though not directed at a terrestrial target, the nuclear threshold would have been crossed. Even a so-called "irrational" adversary would have to think twice before using a nuclear weapon. The U.S. certainly would view such an attack differently than if a conventional weapon had been utilized and would respond accordingly. During the Cold War, a distinct demarcation between conventional and nuclear weapons existed. Even if lower-yield battlefield or tactical nuclear weapons had been used (e.g., in a scenario involving a Warsaw Pact invasion of a NATO country), escalation to a larger-scale retaliation using the U.S.'s strategic nuclear arsenal was a very real possibility. Although a "doctrine" may not be in place to respond to a low-yield nuclear ASAT scenario, the U.S. would probably go beyond utilizing conventional weapons to retaliate. Potential adversaries know this. For example, Washington made clear to Iraq that use of chemical or biological weapons would trigger an appropriate American response, including the possibility of nuclear retaliation.

Microsatellites

One potential nonnuclear ASAT threat comes in the form of microsatellites, also known as parasitic satellites. These are small, lightweight, inexpensive, and highly capable systems that could perform a variety of missions (many of them legitimate peacetime operations such as satellite repair). Microsatellites could be utilized for counterspace missions by flying alongside a target until commanded to disrupt, and then disable or destroy the target. Detecting and defending against such an attack would be difficult. It has been previously reported that the Chinese plan to develop and deploy a microsatellite ASAT, but, historically, Chinese plans for high-technology weapon systems have vastly exceeded that nation's ability to develop and field them successfully. For instance, China has not been able to develop and deploy a modern fighter aircraft that is even remotely on a par with former Soviet or current U.S. planes.

If a microsatellite threat were to evolve, the question is: What is the appropriate response? If the supposed microsatellite ASAT were nonnuclear, "hardening" satellites against nuclear explosions or electromagnetic pulse would not increase their survivability. Self-defense would be problematic because a microsatellite ASAT would be difficult to detect and could also reside in an otherwise nonthreatening satellite. Of course, the U.S. should not adopt a policy of shooting down every Chinese satellite launched on the presumption that it might contain a microsatellite ASAT. Maneuverability would allow a satellite to evade or dodge a directed ASAT attack, but adding maneuverability to a satellite system would increase the total cost by between 10 and 20%, depending on the satellite altitude (warning time), nature of the threat, and threat detection efficiency. Perhaps the best and least-expensive way to increase survivability against a potential microsatellite ASAT threat is to use decoys that simulate the radar and optical signatures of the target satellite. Jamming systems could be employed as well to confuse an ASAT's homing system. Analysts estimate that satellite decoys would increase the total system cost by between one and 10%.

Other potential ASAT weapons include laser, radio frequency (RF), and particle beam weapons. Laser weapons would generate intense beams of light to inflict thermal damage on the target satellite. RF weapons would emit an intense burst of radio energy--usually either high-power microwave or ultrawideband--so as to disable the satellite's electronic components. Particle beam weapons use accelerated atomic particles (such as negative hydrogen or deuterium ions) to generate an intense beam that disables electronic components. Again, it is important to emphasize that these are postulated--not operational--ASAT weapons. Further, they are all very technologically advanced, extremely expensive, and therefore outside the capabilities of most--if not all--potential adversaries, especially the rogue states.

As important and potentially vulnerable as current U.S. space-based assets might be, deploying actual weapons (whether defensive or offensive) would likely be perceived as very threatening to the status quo. Because of this, any move to weaponize space would likely precipitate a response to counter such capability, and weapons in space would indeed be tempting targets for a preemptive attack by an adversary.

To be sure, not deploying weapons in space is no guarantee that potentially hostile nations (such as China) will not develop and deploy ASATs. However, it is virtually certain that deploying American weapons in space will lead to the development and deployment of ASATs to counter such weapons. The U.S. should therefore not be the first to weaponize space--either with defensive weapons or with offensive ASATs. However, deploying defensive decoys--rather than weapons--would not inevitably lead to such an arms race.

In the final analysis, any near-term moves toward weaponizing space are premature. If Washington is concerned that some nations may find American military and commercial satellites tempting targets, it ought to look first to its foreign policy and military posture as a factor in motivating those nations to take hostile actions toward the U.S. According to Richard Betts at the Council on Foreign Relations, "American activism to guarantee international stability is, paradoxically, the prime source of American vulnerability."

The other rationale for weaponizing space is ballistic missile defense (BMD). Although the Bush Administration has yet to lay out in detail an exact plan or architecture for a BMD system, Pres. Bush argued forcefully during the presidential campaign that a missile defense system must protect not just the U.S., but friends, allies, and forces deployed overseas. The President repeatedly made clear that, to move forward on BMD, he intended to abandon the ABM Treaty, and the U.S. gave Russia the requisite six months notice of American withdrawal from the treaty in December, 2001.

Certainly, any BMD system will need to rely on space systems--at a minimum for launch detection and early warning, currently provided by the Defense Support Program (DSP) satellites, which are supposed to be replaced by the Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS) high satellites. Even a ground-based system (i.e., interceptors and radars) might be supported by space-based sensors for midcourse tracking and discrimination (such as the proposed SBIRS low satellites).

The question the President has left open, at least for now, is whether a BMD system will include space-based weapons. Bush has not specifically excluded space-based weapons and has abandoned the ABM Treaty--hints that space-based weapons could eventually become a reality.

Perhaps more important is the fact that Rumsfeld is viewed by many as the architect and moving force behind both missile defense and space policy in the Bush Administration. If this is true, it is reasonable to conclude that the prescription for space policy outlined in the Space Commission report might represent a blueprint for action.

Specifically, the report argues that the U.S. needs space-based weapons (to defend satellites) and implies they should be part of a BMD system. American space policy and capabilities--as they have been described in the Space Commission report and discussed by some in the military--are, by their very nature, global. As such, they merely serve to foster a global, space-based BMD system. In other words, the sole way to defend the panoply of satellites orbiting the Earth is to have a constellation of space-based weapons to provide "space superiority," and those space-based weapons will have an inherent capability to shoot at ballistic missiles (whether they threaten the satellites or not). Thus, a military requirement to protect satellites (even in the absence of a true antisatellite or ASAT threat) may be a way to pursue development and deployment of a global BMD in a potentially less visible and publicly debated way.

Protecting the homeland

The rhetoric and rationale for public support for BMD is because the U.S. is vulnerable to ballistic missiles. Therefore, a BMD system should be a truly national missile defense (the Administration has eliminated the distinction between national missile defense and theater missile defense) to protect the American homeland and not a global defense to provide worldwide protection for the following reasons:

* The technology for a limited land-based system is the most mature and is currently in its early stages of operational testing.

* U.S. allies are wealthy enough to build their own missile defenses.

* Any defense expenditure must be commensurate with the threat, and the limited ballistic missile threat does not justify the large expenditures required for a global, layered defense system.

* If thicker and wider missile defenses cause U.S. policymakers to feel more secure against missile attacks, they may be more tempted to engage in reckless overseas military adventures, which would actually reduce U.S. security.

The concern is that, much as missile defense advocates have used sea-based missile defense as an attempt to open the door to a larger, more-expensive global missile defense, space defense policy will be used as a way to justify and achieve a global--as opposed to national--missile defense. Indeed, if space policy is implemented as outlined in the Space Commission report, a global missile defense may be inevitable.

Yet, building a global BMD system could prove to be counterproductive. Such a system would be able to shoot down not only ballistic missiles, but ASATs as well as orbiting satellites and spacecraft. Nations that feel the U.S. is trying to hold their satellites at risk or prevent them from launching satellites will have incentives (that would be nonexistent in the absence of such a threat) to develop ASATs, regardless of the technological hurdles, and will be more likely to expend the necessary resources to acquire such a capability. Those ASATs could put the entire constellation of American military and civilian satellites at risk. With the greatest dependence of any nation on space assets (both civilian and military), the U.S. could ultimately see its security reduced if hostile nations are spurred to develop and deploy ASATs (which they currently do not have) in response to U.S. deployment of a space-based BMD.

This is not to say that there are no legitimate military uses of space. Indeed, there are some that are unique to the military--such as integrated tactical warning and attack assessment. This is an area where military needs and requirements cannot be met by commercial systems. That is, the military will be the sole user for systems such as DSP satellites that monitor missile launches worldwide.

Virtually all other applications of space are "dual use." To be sure, military needs and requirements must be recognized. For instance, the military and intelligence agencies may have unique requirements for surveillance and reconnaissance that can be met solely with their own dedicated satellites--either for reasons of security of data or technical requirements (e.g., resolution, processing time). A similar situation exists with regard to communications. For example, Milstar is a dedicated military satellite communications system that provides secure, jam-resistant, nuclear-hardened communications for all the American forces. In general, though, the military should make greater use of commercial space satellites.

First, wherever possible, the Department of Defense should utilize commercial assets, rather than spend needlessly on unique military assets. For instance, the military should use existing communications satellites for its nonsecure communications capability. It also can make use of commercial imaging satellites, such as Earth Watch's EarlyBird 1, Space Imaging's EOSAT (which will initially offer one-meter resolution, the highest of any commercially available system), and Orbiting Image's OrbView.

Second, whenever feasible, the military should consider using distributed and redundant commercial satellite systems as a means to reduce vulnerability to attack, rather than deploying unique military systems that are likely to be more expensive and take longer to deploy. For example, it may be more cost-effective to develop and deploy smaller satellites in a distributed system configuration designed to operate at low-Earth and medium-Earth orbit than larger, heavier satellites operating in geosynchronous (stationary) orbit. That approach is especially meritorious if there is a potential shortage of heavy-lift launch capability.

Third, military requirements should not be imposed on shared nonmilitary satellites. For instance, the military should not require hardening against electromagnetic pulse on commercial satellites that are also used by the military. To the extent that such requirements are absolute needs, the military should deploy its own dedicated systems to meet those requirements. Neither commercial satellite operators nor the other users of commercial satellites should shoulder any cost burdens imposed by the military (and, clearly, the military must be more realistic about its requirements).

In short, in the future, the military will likely have greater reliance on commercial space systems. Although commercial space is not a panacea for the military, it should be the driving force shaping space policy. Defense and national security need to be one component of overall U.S. space policy, but certainly not the primary one. In the post-Cold War environment--with no immediate threat from another great power and none on the horizon (at least in the near to mid term)--Washington must avoid establishing inflated and costly military requirements for space-based resources. U.S. space policy should strive to foster an environment that allows commercial space activity to grow and flourish, rather than create a new area for costly military competition.

Charles V. Pena is a senior defense policy analyst, Cato Institute, Washington, D.C.

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