From Munich to Pearl Harbor: Roosevelt's America and the Origins of the Second World War

From Munich to Pearl Harbor: Roosevelt's America and the Origins of the Second World War. By David Reynolds. Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2002, 209 pages.

At a time when America is seeking a new identity for itself in the world, embarking on a role that is still being defined, and pursuing what appears to be a wholly different set of "strategic interests," Dr. Reynolds' study of the last time such a radical turn of events had occurred is both timely and interesting. Obviously, the diplomatic, moral, doctrinal, and economic environment is profoundly different and the objectives, allies, instruments, and modalities are not comparable. But, there are some subtle yet obvious similarities emerging from America's "isolationist" cocoon in a final and decisive rupture during the Second World War to become leader of the free world later, and getting out of the timidities and introspections of the "Vietnam syndrome" to settle into its hegemonic posture today. If one looks for continuities, then it is possible to argue that America's current position of exclusive leadership in a unipolar world is a logical, though not inevitable, culmination of the process that began during the tumultuous experience of the earlier period. Dr. Reynolds himself does not extend that argument since his book was written before the explosive events that ushered in--what the neo-cons call--the New American Century. But, his analysis and judgments easily evoke such comparisons.

There are three main objectives the book tries to explore. They are: 1) "to provide a succinct narrative of the twisting road from Munich to Pearl Harbor"; 2) "to analyze how Roosevelt led Americans into a new global perspective on international relations ... (which) involved both geopolitics and ideology"; and 3) "to spotlight developments in the period 1938-41 that were later important for US foreign and defense policy in the cold war ear." Dr. Reynolds is eminently successful in meeting all his goals.

He identifies the early part of the Twentieth Century as one consumed by three issues--empire, ideology, and economics. Even though America was not involved in these imperial machinations and ambitions (after all, it was a late and a most reluctant imperialist), was not engaged in the ideological debates and challenges that Europe was reeling from (given its ideological innocence and pragmatic orientations), and did not initially suffer from worldwide economic decline (in fact, the 1920s was a period of extraordinary buoyancy), it could not fully escape the impact of these universal forces. However, as the world hurtled towards war in the 1930s, Roosevelt's America remained locked in some ambivalence and stasis, preoccupied more with domestic economic concerns than with the international catastrophe looming in the horizon.

The President could neither convince the country nor secure the support of Congress in responding to the dangers and threats being demonstrated in Europe. His policy of "un-neutral rearmament" (i.e., promoting a weapons build-up at home and providing military hardware to friends) was turned down by Congress in 1939. Not even the "dramatic shifts in the international balance" that occurred in 1940 with Germany advancing swiftly in Europe, and securing the support of Italy and Japan through the Tripartite Act, could provoke any radical change in policy direction.

Roosevelt's decisive victory over Wendell Willkie in the election of 1940 (in which Roosevelt easily deflected and neutralized charges that he was hawkish) allowed him to be a bit bolder. He outlined his liberal internationalism in the famous "four freedoms" speech in January 1941, maneuvered Congressional support for the Lend Lease act critical to the Allies, began to use the phrase "the second world war" by May, signed the Atlantic Charter signaling substantive cooperation with Britain in August, promised loans to the beleaguered Soviet Union in September, and gradually chipped away at the Neutrality Act which limited his authority. At the same time, talks with Japan centering around the economic sanctions imposed on it, and its occupation of China, gradually ground down into a diplomatic stalemate. Pearl Harbor changed everything.

In this context, there are lively debates that still resonate in this country. Would the United States have entered the Second World War if the Japanese had not attacked? Did Pearl Harbor "cause" our entry into the War, or merely determine the time and the theatre? Was the attack a surprise (we had already broken their cryptographic code) or did Roosevelt merely manipulate Japan to fire the first shot so that he could retaliate in righteous indignation? In the currency of today's language, what did the President know and when did he know it? Reynolds does not address those issues, but discusses the outcomes of that fateful event in some detail.

Reynolds suggests that the American entry into the Second World War generated three principles. First, it solidified presidential supremacy in foreign policy. Roosevelt's policy innovations from 1941 significantly, and permanently, altered the traditional power-sharing balances in the president's favor. Second, the President was able to successfully "educate" the public into a new globalist conception of international affairs, both at the geo-political and ideological levels. The expansion of the concept of national security, and the projection of American values into the world, became the pre-eminent compulsions of American foreign policy. And finally, the period set powerful precedents. Thus, the president's ability to circumvent Congress through executive agreements, the gradual consolidation of a military-industrial complex, the self-conscious acceptance of America as the antithesis of dominant and threatening totalitarian ideologies which it was destined to confront and defeat, and a sense of optimism and omnipotence that has defined America since, are all derived from the experiences of that fateful period. We can easily see some of those lessons and reflections clearly impressed upon our collective unconscious today.

Dr. Reynolds' slim book is model of clarity and organization. His deconstruction of Roosevelt's method (where the President is shown to be careful, patient, and realistic, crafty without being manipulative, and instinctive and impeccable in his sense of timing, opportunity, and language) is astute and insightful. But, it is in his analysis of the changes in the military and the international role of the United States that he is most prescient and persuasive. The historical narrative is deftly structured, crisply written, and cogently argued. The book should have wide appeal both among scholars and lay people.

Reviewed by: Ahrar Ahmad, Black Hills State University

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