World War I: Joint Fires in the East African Campaign - creative use of artillery in war

Peter J. Williams

Current military thinking increasingly emphasizes "jointness" with leaders required to employ manoeuverist principles and "think outside the box." Some hold the view that these are relatively new developments--or at least have come to prominence only since 1945.

A study of a little known campaign in the First World War, far from the morass of the Western Front, puts this popular myth to rest. The innovative use of naval guns as land-based artillery in the 1914 East African Campaign is an example of joint fires that dispels the myth. One German commander, separated from his superiors by vast distances of time and space, was left with the freedom of action to prosecute a campaign in which he never was defeated, even though the British enemy consistently outnumbered his force. He was an artilleryman.

The Theatre of Operations. Before the outbreak of war in 1914, Germany had several African colonies: Cameroon, Togo, German South-West Africa (in the area of modern Namibia) and German East Africa (in the area of modern Tanzania). This article primarily is concerned with the latter. Germany was ceded these areas as part of the 1885 Congo Act between Germany, France, Britain and Belgium. A free-trade zone was established between the African colonies of the treaty signatories.

More importantly, the colonies agreed that during wartime, they would remain neutral. From the outbreak of war, the belligerent parties would have to refrain from hostilities in the neutralized territories and from using them as a base for warlike operations. [1]

German East Africa was vast, encompassing an area larger than France and Germany combined, a total of 384,000 miles. [2] A 3000-foot high plateau dominated its center. The northeast, toward British East Africa (modern Kenya) is primarily savannah with abundant wildlife. Mount Kilimanjaro, the highest mountain in the region, is in this area. Equatorial lands ring Lake Victoria, while the south is mainly highland. The campaign was fought mostly in typical "bush" country, ranging from open parkland to dense forests.

In many ways the theatre was a soldier's nightmare. One combatant described it as follows: "It's almost impossible for those unacquainted with German East Africa to realize the physical, transport and supply difficulties of the advance over this magnificent country of unrivalled scenery and fertility consisting of great mountain systems alternating with huge plains...the malaria mosquito everywhere...everywhere belts infested with the deadly tsetse fly which make an end of animal transport. In the rainy seasons, which occupy about half the year, the country becomes a swamp and military movements become impracticable." [3]

Indeed, nature proved as much a bane to military operations as the enemy. In the disastrous British engagement at Tanga in 1915, African bees helped rout their invading Indian troops and also put a German machine gun out of commission. [4]

In 1914, the population of German East Africa was approximately eight million, mostly made up of the 53 native tribes. The white population was mainly German settlers and numbered 5,336. [5]

German Forces. To protect their interests, the Germans had garrisons in their colonies. In German East Africa, this was the Schutztruppe (Protective Force) of 216 Europeans, 2,540 natives (known as Askaris) and 45 European police. In 1914, the Schutztruppe was organized into 14 independent companies, each consisting of three platoons of 60 men per platoon. At its wartime height, the Schutztruppe never exceeded 3,000 Europeans and 11,000 Askari.

Each company had German officers and two to four machine guns. Rifles were mainly of the 1871 pattern and fired black powder, a great disadvantage in the close fighting to come.[6]

The Schutzrruppe artillery firepower also was limited: 56 small-calibre, obsolete guns.[7] Two of the pieces dated back to 1873.

The German Commander. In 1914, Colonel Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck, aged 45, commanded the Sclzutztruppe. Originally trained as an artillery officer, he also had served with a marine battalion. Although he was nominally the senior commander, the Governor of German East Africa, Dr. Schnee, was the de facto commander-in-chief of the colonial armed forces. While Dr. Schnee hoped to keep his territory neutral in the forthcoming war in accordance with the 1885 treaty, von Lettow-Vorbeck believed this was not the best course of action for Germany. Realizing where the British center of gravity lay, he summarized his philosophy as follows: "My view was that we would best protect our colony by threatening the enemy in his own territory. We could very effectively tackle him at asensitive point, the Uganda Railway." [8]

In a letter to Governor Schnee, he further stated his case: "We have it in our power to hinder the enemy by sheltering our navy in its campaign against enemy transports and by keeping as many troops as possible pinned down in Africa. The Schutztruppe, under my command is ready to do anything in its power to help win the war."[9]

Realizing he was at the end of a long supply line from Germany and that most resources would be devoted to the European theatre, von Lettow-Vorbeck knew his only hope of success lay in skillfully conducting a guerilla campaign. This was directed at vital points, such as the Uganda Railway, the main British supply line between Nairobi and the port of Mombasa.

His campaign was a masterstroke guerilla warfare. It was also one of the harshest campaigns with von LettowVorbeck admitting that on occasion, "A wounded man was relieved of his gun, shot through the head and left to the lions, hyenas or the vultures,"[10]

The Konigsberg. It was into such a theatre that the German light cruiser Seine Majestat Schiff or SMS (translated as His Majesty's Ship) Konigsberg made her voyage into destiny. Neither her crew nor von Lettow-Vobeck could possibly realize the impact she would have on one of the most successful guerilla campaigns of the 20th century.

Built in 1905, the coal-powered Konigsberg displaced 3,400 tons and had a crew of 320. Her captain since April 1914 was Fregatrenkapitan (Commander) Max Loof. At best speed, she could make 24 knots and was faster than any Royal Navy vessel she encountered.

This vessel was a particularly welcome asset that proved invaluable as a commerce raider, attacking allied shipping lanes. Her armament consisted of two torpedo tubes and 10 105-mm (4.1-inch) guns, the latter having a range of 12,700 yards." [11]

The Konigsberg originally had been sent to German East Africa as part of a colonial exhibition to be held in the colony's capital, Dar es Salaam. She arrived in port in June 1914, two months before the outbreak of war. Up to this point, the German naval presence in the area had been rather unimpressive, and the arrival of the new cruiser meant that an older ship, the gunboat Geier, could be detached to lower priority duties with the Far Eastern Squadron under Admiral Graf von Spee. [12]

With war imminent, the Konigsberg did not linger long in port where she would be vulnerable to Royal Navy attacks. She departed the colonial capital at the end of July.

War in East Africa. War was declared on 5 August 1914. Almost immediately, the Konigsberg established her reputation as a serious threat to Allied supply lines to India and the Far East. The next day, she captured the British steamer City of Winchester, the first such vessel to be captured by a German man o'war in the conflict. [13] But the British had not yet seen the worst

In a daring raid on a British anchorage at Zanzibar in September 1914, the Konigsberg attacked and sank the HMS Pegasus. In many ways it was an unequal contest: the British ship was 17 years old and much slower and less heavily armed than her German adversary. In the first victory by a German cruiser against a Royal Navy counterpart, Pegasus was sunk with no damage to the Konigsberg or injury to her crew.

The British recovered the four-inch guns of the Pegasus from her wreckage, mounted them on improvised carriages and drew them by Packard trucks, thus providing the British land forces "instant" artillery.[14] (The British were as poorly provided with war materiel as their German counterparts.)

The Land Campaign. The East African campaign began poorly for the British. The Western Front was seen as the decisive theatre, and East Africa was relegated to the status of a sideshow. Certainly, Allied commanders in East Africa could not expect reinforcements.

Poor intelligence, low morale and troops of dubious quality did not help the British in the disastrous rout during their attempted landings at Tanga in 1915, which ultimately were aborted. As one British officer remarked later, "The chaotic state of affairs here is heartbreaking. No reserve, no discipline, lack of courage in leaders, thousands of unreliable troops and no offensive spirit. I wish to heaven I could get out of it all and fight in the trenches.[15]

After a series of reverses, Lieutenant-General Jan C. Smuts, a South African, was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Imperial Forces in East Africa in early 1916. These forces numbered approximately 27,500 and had 71 pieces of artillery and 123 machine guns. A lawyer by background, Smuts had commanded successfully against the British in the Boer War (1899-1902) and conducted a successful campaign against the Germans in South-West Africa in 1914.

Sink the Konigsberg. By April 1915, with the defeat of von Spee's squadron at the Battle of the Falklands and the destruction of the German raider SMS Emden, the Konigsberg was the only German surface vessel deployed outside the North Sea, and as such, posed a grave threat to British commerce routes. Her destruction became paramount.

To that end, British naval headquarters issued the following order: "The Admiralty have ordered [the cruisers] Chatham, Dartmouth and Weymouth to act as a detached and separate squadron.., to be exclusively employed hunting Konigsberg, and direct that on no account are ships to be diverted from their sole object, namely the capture of Konigsberg." [16]

By that time, the Konigsberg had taken refuge in the Rufiji River Delta south of Dares Salaam to escape the British and take on boiler repairs as there was no convenient friendly port available. German supply ships attempted to replenish her twice. Although both ships were sunk, enough supplies of coal, weapons and ammunition were recovered to maintain the Konigsberg as a threat.

At one point, two battleships, 10 cruisers and 12 lesser ships of the Royal Navy were searching for the Konigsberg. [17] British efforts to destroy the Konigsberg were hampered by the fact that the Rufiji River was too shallow for many Royal Navy deep draught vessels. The only British ships capable of negotiating the river were two monitors, the HMS Mersey and HMS Severn.

The two monitors originally had been destined for the Brazilian Navy but luckily had been put into British service in 1914. These vessels, each armed with one 128-mm and two 152-mm guns, drew only five feet of water. They quickly were dispatched from Britain, arriving off East Africa by June 1915.

Working in concert with seaplanes, which adjusted the fire of their guns, the two ships launched a series of attacks on the cornered Konigsberg. In the process, the valiant raider destroyed one of the seaplanes, but she was engaged in an unequal struggle. After suffering extensive damage, Commander Loof ordered his ship destroyed with a torpedo head and her guns thrown over the side on 11 July 1915. [18]

"Destroyed but not beaten..." Thus began the report Loof wrote after the destruction of his ship. For his valiant efforts he was awarded the Iron Cross, First Class, and was promoted to Kapitan zur See (Captain of the Sea). The other members of the crew received the Iron Cross, Second Class.

Lieutenant-Commander Schonfeld, a retired German naval officer and plantation owner in German East Africa, conceived a bold plan that was to bring immortal fame to the guns and the crew of Konigsberg. He suggested they salvage her guns for von Lettow-Vorbeck's forces to use on land.

So under the noses of the Royal Navy that failed to interdict the salvage operations, the Germans retrieved the 10 105-mm guns from the bottom of the Rufiji River, transported them more than 124 miles to Dares Salaam (via some of Schonfeld's plantation vehicles) and mounted them on gun carriages by mid-August. [19] Employing this simple bit of ingenuity, the Germans expanded and modernized the Schutztruppe artillery holdings. In the process, they added 180 men from the Konigsberg to von Lettow-Vorbeck's force. Indeed, as the British Admiralty admitted, it was "a priceless acquisition." [20]

The guns of Konigsberg were dispersed around German East Africa: five went to Dares Salaam for the defence of the port; two to Tanga north of the capital to repel any repeat Allied landing attempts there; two to the port of Ujiji on Lake Tanganyika at the western end of the railway from Dares Salaam; and one to Mwanza on Lake Victoria. [21]

In addition to the ammunition salvaged from the Konigsberg and her supply ships, ammunition was manufactured in Dar es salaam. [22]

Those members of the ship's company not tasked to act as gun crews were formed into the "Konigsberg Company" and deployed in the south and the southwest of the colony. The company was commanded by Loof's First Officer, Kapitan-Leutnant (Lieutenant-Commander) Georg Koch.

The Konigsberg guns did not see action until March 1916 in fighting around Moshi on the border with British East Africa. One of the guns repelled several British attacks. As part of von Lettow-Vorbeck's strategy to fight a guerilla campaign, German forces could not become involved in pitched battles. In this instance, the Konigsberg gun was destroyed before it could be captured. [23]

In further fighting in the same area, British commanders paid tribute to the German naval gunners who had employed their guns so skillfully: "The enemy's positions were well chosen. In addition to the 4.1 inch (105-mm) gun to the south of the [River] Ruwu, which when it was not directed on the Mounted Brigade, as turned on the attacking infantry, there was a second 4.1-inch gun mounted on a railway track, some distance south of the river which kept up a continuous fire on the dust caused by the advancing infantry and later by the vehicles working in rear of the advancing troops." [24]

Von Lettow-Vorbeck remarked on the same action, "It may be assumed that part of the severe casualties, which the English stated to have amounted on this day to several hundred among the South African Europeans alone, were caused by this gun." [25]

The Allies Close In. When General Smuts took command of the Allied effort, the Allies' fortune started to take a turn for the better. The Belgians conducted an offensive against the Schutztruppe from their own colony to the northeast. With the two railways in German East Africa now threatened, one gun under the command of Lieutenant-Commander Schonfeld was deployed to cover Tabora along the railway. Nevertheless, the Allied offensive gained enough momentum to gain control of two-thirds of the German colony by the end of July 1916.

At this stage, nine Konigsberg guns remained: five in Dares Salaam, two at Ujiji, one at Mwanza and one in the Burungi mountains. [26]

By August, the British landings at Dar es Salaam reduced the number of guns to four. At the last minute, Loof removed one of the remaining guns defending the port.

The Konigsberg guns performed sterling service in helping to defend the capital. For example, while under the command of Lieutenant Wenig, the guns conducted shoot-and-scoot tactics to deceive the enemy into believing the Germans had many more guns than they did.

By this time, von Lettow-Vorbeck's forces had been severely depleted but not defeated. In addition to the four Konigsberg guns, his forces had 16 smaller field guns and 73 machine guns and numbered 100 Europeans and 7,300 Askari. [27] Von Lettow-Vorbeck maintained confidence, however, that his strategy was correct. When referring to Smuts' call for his surrender, von Lettow-Vorbeck said the call demonstrated that "...he [Smuts] had reached the end of his resources." [28]

To maintain freedom of action, von Lettow-Vorbeck realized he must keep his own supply lines open. British landings south of Dar es Salaam near Kibata in September provided the opportunity to draw more Allied forces away from the critical northern railways. Employing a Konigsberg gun and another field gun, he fired 300 rounds against the British at Kibata. He achieved his goal, commenting later that, "Our vigorous actions at Kibata forced him [the British] to move from Kilwa against us and to leave the rest of the country and our supply system in peace." [29]

For his efforts in tying down the Imperial Forces, von Lettow-Vorbeck was awarded Germany's highest decoration, the Pour le Merite (the "Blue Max") in 1916.

The Portuguese Factor. While von Lettow-Vorbeck believed he held the Imperial Forces at bay, in March 1916 a new consideration arose with the Portugal's entry into the war. The Portuguese declared war on Germany, perhaps hoping to cash in on British gains and citing supposedly "numerous barbarous acts" committed by German troops on Portuguese East African soil. Hoping to gain territory on the border with the German colony, lands the Portuguese had long coveted, their hopes for a speedy victory were quickly dashed.

The Portuguese invaders crossed the River Rovuma on the border and were routed near Lindi in actions somewhat reminiscent of the abortive British landings at Tanga in 1915. Again, one of the Konigsberg guns played a central role. It was part of a force that included three Askari companies as well as two European companies, all under Loof's command. "The Portuguese were severely defeated on the 28th of November, mainly by gunfire from a Konigsberg gun, and scattered into the jungle, leaving to the Germans four 76-mm mountain guns and seven machine guns with much ammunition." [30]

This action was typical of the way in which the Germans fought in East Africa. The Schutztruppe conducted a guerilla campaign expecting no supplies or reinforcements from Germany and holding to the higher intent that they should continue to draw Allied resources away from more decisive theatres. By the end of the year, only three Konigsberg guns remained; the other guns had been destroyed or overrun after first being rendered inoperable. [31]

By early 1917, the entire German East African coast from Tanga and Dar es Salaam south to Lundi was in British hands. The Imperial Forces expanded westward into the interior.

In August, the Germans, taking advantage of the interior lines, capitalized on their previous success and harassed the British at Lindi with one of the Konigsberg guns.

Von Lettow-Vorbeck, who had been promoted to major general in June, commented on this action, "The exact location of his trenches gave us the advantage of being able to get the range for the 10.5 centimeter gun of the Konigsberg, which was with Wahle's force. This was also done with good results; at any rate the enemy eventually evacuated his trenches on the following day and retired." [32]

Knowing he must preserve his own force while tying down the Allies, von Lettow-Vorbeck invaded Portuguese East Africa in October with a force that included the Konigsberg's last gun. [33] Lieutenant Wenig, who had employed the guns so well at Lindi, commanded the invasion force. The force included 300 whites, 1,700 Askaris and 3,000 carriers.

The foray into Portugese territory provided a treasure of weapons and supplies for von Lettow-Vorbeck's forces, including modern rifles. As he reported, "...[we] were able to discard our 1871 pattern rifles almost entirely." [34]

Sadly, Loof did not participate in the final year of battles because he surrendered with his force in November.

The Final Year. Buoyed by success, von Lettow-Vorbeck felt confident enough to continue the fight, sending forces back into German East Africa and, from thence, into Northern Rhodesia. For the final year, he continued to engage in hit-and-run tactics, constantly harrying the British who were never able to engage him in pitched, decisive battle.

On 11 November 1918, an armistice was proclaimed in Europe, ending hostilities. In East Africa, however, the Germans continued their fight against the Allies; von Lettow-Vorbeck only heard about the Armistice on 13 November. Ten days later at a ceremony in Abercorn, Northern Rhodesia, von Lettow-Vorbeck surrendered his force to the British. Special provisions had been made for his forces in the armistice document.

The final Konigsberg gun under Lieutenant Wenig had been destroyed. His force numbered 135 Europeans, 1,168 Askaris, 1 Portuguese mountain gun, 37 machine guns and 1,168 rifles, all captured from the Allies. [35]

In a campaign where von Lettow-Vorbeck's forces never exceeded 12,000 men, the Allies had fielded some 300,000 men, including 137 generals. [36] The British never defeated von Lettow-Vorbeck. As he summarized, "Yet in spite of the enormously superior numbers at the disposal of the enemy, our small force, the rifle strength of which was only about 1,400 at the time of the armistice, had remained in the field, always ready for action and possessed of the highest determination." [37]

One Writer commenting on the entire East African Campaign, analyzed Allied and German aims and results as follows: "The [Imperial] East African Force was brought into being and the campaign undertaken with the object of conquering German East Africa. In that it was successful. It was continued to bring about the destruction or capture of the remnants of German forces under General von Lettow. In that it was unsuccessful. It cannot be denied that von Lettow had achieved the end he had set himself to do." [38]

Fittingly, the Schutztruppe and Konigsberg veterans were treated to a victory parade through the Brandenburg Gate in Berlin upon their return home in 1919. As one author referred to them, they were truly "the Germans who never lost."

Lessons for Today. Modern Field Artillerymen can learn several lessons for today.

Thinking "Outside the Box." When faced with the possibility of having to give up the ship, as the Konigsberg's crew in the Rufiji, perhaps many would be forgiven for thinking they had no further contribution to make to the war. Not so in the case of Lieutenant-Commander (Retired) Schonfeld, who immediately realized the value of the destroyed cruiser's guns to the German cause.

It was also ingenious when von Lettow-Vorbeck dispersed the guns across the entire colony, rather than concentrating them in one place. This achieved two aims. Dispersing the guns supported his guerilla strategy, which emphasized hit-and-run, harassing attacks against potential weaknesses rather than standing for battles against a numerically superior enemy. The latter type of engagement was one the Germans could never hope to win--the type of engagement in which they probably would have lost all their artillery in the first battle.

Second, by spreading his artillery throughout the theatre of operations, von Lettow-Vorbeck often deceived the British as to the true size and strength of his forces, thus causing them to devote an inordinate amount of resources to their destruction. As General Smuts admitted, "The Konisberg, though destroyed, yet made her voice heard over that vast country, for her 10 big naval guns, pulled by teams of 400 stalwart natives each, accompanied the enemy armies in all directions, and with other naval guns and howitzers smuggled into the country made the enemy in many a fight, stronger in heavy artillery than we were." [39]

Transparency of Fires. Fires are becoming effects-based with less emphasis on the delivery platform. Recent US Army experiments with effects control centres (ECCs) have endorsed this concept. [40] Attaining the desired effects from a naval gun platform was certainly in the minds of those responsible for giving the guns of Konigsberg a new life as land-based artillery.

Mounting the 16-inch guns of the now decommissioned Iowa Class battleships on land carriages is, perhaps, not the best way forward. But recent initiatives by the US Navy to develop the DD-21 Zumwalt Class land attack destroyer is a program all fire s coordinators should follow with interest. [41] Further, naval plans to develop a 155-mm advanced gun system (AGS) for the DD-21 with a range of 100 nautical miles (182 kilometers), firing unitary and armour-defeating munitions, including dual-purpose improved conventional munitions (DPICM), are also of interest to the Army and Marine Corps. [42]

Jointness as the Way Forward. Hand-in-hand with effects-based fires comes the realization that joint forces will conduct future operations and provide the fires to support those operations. Admittedly, von Lettow-Vorbeck had little choice in employing the crew of the Konigsberg as ground troops. But he recognized the crew's expertise in long-range, accurate Fires and the high morale that comes from shared operational experience; he swiftly converted the sailors into a decisive element of the Schutztruppe. This could not have been easy, as Loof and von Lettow-Vorbeck did not always agree on tactical or strategic matters.

Today, inter-service rivalry often inhibits the adoption of a true spirit of "jointness" that will be required in future operations. The US Marine Corps (USMC), a force inherently joint by nature--Marines have their own aircraft and routinely work closely with the Navy--are thus well-placed for the future. The recent creation of the US Joint Forces Command (formerly US Atlantic Command) is a step in the right direction.

The United Kingdom has taken jointness to what one can argue is its ultimate logical end by examining the possibility of using standard 155-mm modular-charge ammunition in a naval role. [43]

Redlegs everywhere must work together to develop joint--ultimately combined--fires tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) of the future, keeping in mind it is the effects, not the platforms, that matters.

"The future just ain't what it used to be." [44] Senior leaders in the USMC have predicted that future wars will be more the "stepchild of Chechyna" than the "son of Desert Storm." [46] Certainly, the operations in which our armed forces find themselves increasingly committed bear this out: the Balkans, Somalia, East Timor, Sierra Leone. Conflicts now are more of an internecine nature within states rather than "traditional" wars between nations. Moreover, these are actions in which the opposing forces are of a paramilitary or terrorist nature vice professional armies.

Just as von Lettow-Vorbeck's troops who, armed with expedient artillery, made themselves a force to be reckoned with in tropical Africa against a technologically superior force, so might the terrorist or paramilitary of the future give a Western digitized army more than "a run for its money." Such a low-tech force will operate in a new kind of jungle--increasingly urban--and conduct guerrilla tactics with machine guns in the back of a pick up truck--operations similar to those in Somalia. In short, we must be prepared to deal with the Schutztruppes and Konigsberg guns of the future.

Joint fires and, for that matter, "lateral thinking" are not often associated with fire support during the First World War. The exploits of the Konigsberg and her crew in support of German operations in East Africa provide a sterling example of the employment of joint fires in a campaign that was ultimately successful in its aims. Fire support coordinators should learn the lessons of history as we define the joint fires doctrine of the future.

Major Peter J. Williams, Royal Canadian Artillery, won First Place in the US Field Artillery Association's 2001 History Writing Contest with this article. He is the Chief Gunnery Instructor at the Royal Canadian Artillery School in New Brunswick, Canada. His previous assignment was as the Canadian Exchange Officer at the Royal School of Artillery in the United Kingdom. He commanded D Battery, 2d Regiment, Royal Canadian Horse Artillery (2 RCHA) in Petawawa, Ontario, Canada, in support of the Royal Canadian Dragoons. He also served as the Operations Officer of 2 RCHA as well as Battery Captain of and Forward Observation Officer in D Battery, 2 RCHA. He was a member of the UN Force in Cyprus, the UN Angola Verification Mission and the NATO Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia. He holds a Master of Arts in History from the Open University in Milton Keynes, the United Kingdom.

Endnotes:

(1.) Leonard Mosley, Duel for Kilimanjaro: The East African Campaign 1914-18 (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1963), 16.

(2.) Brigadier-General J.I.W. Crowe, General Smuts' Campaign in East Africa (London: John Murray, 1918), x.

(3.) Ibid.

(4.) Mosley, 68.

(5.) Ibid., 35.

(6.) Major JR. Sibley, Tanganyikan Guerilla: East African Campaign 1914-1918 (London: Ballantine, 1973), 18.

(7.) Crowe, 25.

(8.) General Paul Von Lettow-Vorbeck, My Reminiscences of East Africa: The Campaign for German East Africa in World War One (London: Hurst and Blacken, 1920), 21.

(9.) Mosley, 25.

(10.) Von Lettow-Vorbeck, 97.

(11.) Edwin P. Hoyt, Jr., The Germans Who Never Lost (London: Leslie Frewin, 1968), 21.

(12.) Ibid., 12.

(13.) E. Keeble Chatterton, The Konigsberg Adventure (London: Hurst and Blackett, 1932), 38.

(14.) Crowe, 42.

(15.) Colonel Richard Meinertzhagen, Army Diary 1899-1926 (London: Oliver and Boyd, 1960), 117.

(16.) Chatterton, 47.

(17.) Hoyt, 81.

(18.) Ibid., 148.

(19.) Ibid., 163.

(20.) Mosley, 95.

(21.) Hoyt, 163.

(22.) Crowe, 32.

(23.) Mosley, 128. Von Lettow-Vorbeck's orders to his commanders in such cases were to, "Harass, kill, but, don't get caught!"

(24.) Crowe, 102.

(25.) Von Lettow-Vorbeck, 116.

(26.) Hoyt, 175.

(27.) Ibid.. 208.

(28.) Mosley, 153.

(29.) Sibley, 116.

(30.) General Sir Martin Farndale, KCB, History of the Royal Regiment of Artillery: The Forgotten Fronts and the Home Base 1914-1918 (London: The Royal Artillery Institution, 1988), 335.

(31.) Mosley, 173.

(32.) Von Lettow-Vorbeck, 205.

(33.) Hoyt, 234.

(34.) Von Lettow-Vorbeck, 277.

(35.) Hoyt, 236.

(36.) Von Lettow-Vorbeck, 325.

(37.) Ibid., 232.

(38.) Brigadier-General C.P. Fendhall, The East African Force 1915-1919 (London: H.F. and G. Witherby, 1921), 222.

(39.) Chatterton, 280.

(40.) The author has had the good fortune to participate in the future fires command and control ([F.sup.2][C.sup.2]) concept experimentation plan (CEP) at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, in October-November 2000, in which a fires and effects coordination cell (FECC) was exercised using surrogate situational awareness (SA) technology. The FECC was responsible for coordinating both lethal and non-lethal effects for an interim brigade combat team (IBCT) in small-scale contingencies (SSCs) as well as major theatre mar (MTW) scenarios. Although one serial of the CEP remains to be run, the concept of the FECC was agreed by both maneuver commanders and fire supporters to be a highly worthwhile concept.

(41.) See Colonel James J. Kuzmick, USMCR (Retired), and Captain Christopher P. McNamara, USN (Retired) "Land Attack From the Sea," US Naval Institute Proceedings (August 1999), 52-55.

(42.) Mark Hewish, "USN Aims for 'Maritime Dominance,'" Jane's International Defense Review, Vol. 3, No. 3 (October 2000), 57.

(43.) Richard Scott. "UK Studies Future Naval 155 mm Gun," Jane's Defense Weekly, (2 August 2000), 29.

(44.) A quote attributed to Yogi Berra.

(45.) Lieutenant General Martin Steele, "The Three Block War," Armed Forces Journal International (January 1998), 37.

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