文章基本信息

标题：The Nash equilibrium in the policy mix model for Czechia, Hungary, and Romania
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作者：Joanna Stawska ; Maciej Malaczewski ; Paulina Malaczewska 等
期刊名称：Cogent Economics & Finance
电子版ISSN：2332-2039
出版年度：2021
卷号：9
期号：1
页码：1869380
DOI：10.1080/23322039.2020.1869380
出版社：Taylor and Francis Ltd
摘要：The aim of the paper is to compare the sensitivity of a government’s fiscal policy and a central bank’s monetary policy, which are in Nash equilibrium in the case of a non-cooperative game between the government and the central bank in Czechia, Hungary, and Romania. The analysis for each country is conducted from the date of its accession to the European Union. The research period for Czechia and Hungary includes the quarters 2004Q2-2019Q2, and for Romania, 2007Q1-2019Q2. The study has demonstrated that in Romania the government’s response to interest rate changes is the strongest and the central bank’s response to changes in the budget deficit turned out to be the weakest. On the other hand, the strongest response of the central bank to changes in the budget deficit turned out to be in Hungary, which means that the central bank in Hungary makes a significant correction of interest rates as a result of changes in the budget deficit.
关键词：monetary policy fiscal policy game theory Nash equilibrium non-cooperative game policy mix