文章基本信息

标题：Effects of Contract and Trust on Franchisor Performance
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作者：Esther Calderon-Monge ; Ivan Pastor-Sanz
期刊名称：Contemporary Economics
印刷版ISSN：2084-0845
出版年度：2017
卷号：11
期号：4
页码：383-400
DOI：10.5709/ce.1897-9254.251
出版社：University of Finance and Management, Warsaw
摘要：The franchisor-franchisee relationship is governed by contracts and trust. This paper analyzes how formal (contracts) and relational (trust) governance mechanisms affected franchisor performance in a service sector franchise for the period 2008¬2015. Using the SOM method in the empirical analysis, the results revealed that trust-based governance was more prominent than contract-based governance in the multi-unit franchise network and the cross-franchising network, negatively affecting franchisor performance in the multi-unit franchise network and positively affecting franchisor performance in the cross-franchising network. In contrast, contracts were more prominent than trust in single-unit franchising, negatively affecting franchisor performance. The primary practical implication is that the franchisor should prevent franchisees in the MUF network from opening new outlets in the same city and competing for the existing outlet’s customers.
关键词：single-unit franchising; multi-unit franchising; cross-franchising; trust; contract This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License .