Local religious peacemakers: an untapped resource in U.S. foreign policy.

Jafari, Sheherazade

Sectarian violence in the Middle East; religious nationalism in South Asia; threats of religious extremism in the West; interreligious battles in Africa; religious suppression in East Asia. These realities suggest that religion plays a significant role in the modern world and, by implication, U.S. foreign policy. The U.S. government, despite its own secular tradition, is challenged by the intersections between the role of religion and other international objectives. Misunderstanding or even dismissing religion proves to be deadly.

Over the last few years, the government has made some attempts to better accommodate contemporary religious issues, but the results are limited. Actions and reactions continue to be based on a cursory understanding of religion's influence, an outdated understanding of conflict and a misguided response to the interplay of the two. If attention is paid to religion, the focus remains on the extremist beliefs and actions of a minority, rather than the ways it guides and inspires the majority and can be harnessed for good. Further, there is widespread recognition and much evidence that today's conflicts differ significantly from those of the Cold War era (i.e., the majority of contemporary conflicts are not between nation states; rather they involve state and non-state actors and are often based on identity). (1) Despite this shift, we have not always responded with corresponding changes in the methods used to resolve conflicts. In general, current government approaches continue to discount the complexity of religion and conflict, especially at the local level, in favor of immediate action and oversimplified "us versus them" explanations.

This response is problematic. When we view religion as strictly a promoter of violence or dismiss it as irrelevant to our goals, we risk misunderstanding the local dynamics of conflict and simultaneously overlook a potent resource for addressing urgent conflicts. Religion, with its unmatched authority among many communities in every region of the world, carries within it a diverse set of traditions and methodologies that promote peace. Individuals who have the knowledge, credibility and inclination to tap into these resources--local, peace-seeking religious leaders--may carry some of the answers to combating those who abuse religion to ignite violence.

This article argues that in an increasingly globalized and religiously diverse world, local religious peacemakers are critical partners in diplomacy. An in-depth knowledge of their communities is critical for building societies conducive to stability and development and meeting national foreign policy goals. Following a brief description of its methodology, this article presents a concise background on how religion is a challenge for U.S. foreign policy. This will be followed by a discussion on religion's contemporary place in world affairs, the changing nature of conflict and its resolution, and how these two factors necessitate a closer look at the role of individual religious peacemakers working at the grassroots level. Based on interviews with local religious peacemakers, coupled with research on their work in armed conflict zones, this article then examines their important roles in and contributions to their countries' peace processes. Finally, some recommendations are offered on how U.S. government officials and diplomats can benefit from the efforts of local religious peacemakers and enhance their chances of reaching their security and policy objectives.

METHODOLOGY AND DEFINITIONS

Since 1993, the Tanenbaum Center for Interreligious Understanding has been identifying, supporting and studying the work of relatively unrecognized religiously-motivated peacemakers working in areas of armed conflict around the world. (2) This article is based on a series of interviews with and research on members of Tanenbaum's Peacemakers in Action network. Although these men and women are from vastly different cultures, conflict situations and religious backgrounds, they share a set of characteristics distinguishing them from other actors. For each of them, religion serves as both a source of motivation and a practical resource in their peacemaking efforts. Each works in an area of armed conflict, defined here as violent and, often, protracted. Whether as members of clergy or lay leaders, they work among their people, witnessing the suffering and destruction first hand. They often put their own lives and freedom at risk to conduct critical peacemaking work. Yet, too often they do not receive the support and recognition they deserve for their efforts, operating with limited resources, hidden behind the headlines that declare religion as a source for conflict}

This article discusses the work of eight religious peacemakers. Although they work in six distinct conflicts, the discussion here intends to highlight their specific contributions to resolving conflicts in their countries rather than analyzing the conflicts themselves. The first profile of two peacemakers in Northern Ireland sets the stage and is more in depth than the rest, providing more detailed information on their work over a span of almost thirty years. The remaining six profiles support this article's thesis through additional examples of religious peacemaking in other contexts.

Tanenbaum purposefully focuses on the peacemakers' roles as religious individuals, rather than the role of the institutions to which they may be affiliated. In recent years, some much-needed scholarship has emerged on religion in conflict resolution. The findings provide us with critical information on mobilizing religious resources for peace, interfaith dialogue and the peacebuilding work already conducted by a variety of religious communities. (4) However, this new field continues to concentrate on the role of religious bodies, including such institutions as the Catholic Church, faith-based charitable and humanitarian organizations and diverse religious movements. Focusing the spotlight on the individual fills a gap in the literature by recognizing the ways that individuals and institutions play related but different roles in interventions, including in relationship-building and reconciliation efforts--a point that is particularly relevant in conflict resolution because positive transformation within a community ultimately involves changes in behavior at the individual level. Further, to encourage successful conflict resolution efforts at the institutional level, one must understand the men and women behind them. In fact, many of the peacemakers discussed in this article have successfully founded their own religious peacemaking organizations. (5)

The article uses the words peacemaker and peacemaking broadly, rather than the restricted definition that refers to creating peace agreements and other official diplomatic efforts. Here, its use stems from the capacity in which members of the Tanenbaum Peacemakers in Action network use the concept to define their own efforts. Their work includes a variety of activities designed to create environments conducive to peace. They negotiate and mediate, train and provide peace education. They initiate post-conflict trauma and healing programs, as well as economic and social development activities. They create institutions that can instill and maintain a culture of peace. Some are involved in official peacemaking efforts as well, such as creating peace agreements or working directly with government officials and diplomats. Ultimately, the broad definition of peacemaking used here encompasses the multitude of efforts required to resolve and transform the intractable, identity-based conflicts prevalent today. Finally, this article considers religion as a set of beliefs that are understood by its followers to be sacred and are intended to guide one's understanding of life and corresponding actions. Here, religious peacemaking includes a variety of actions guided by religion toward the specific end result of peace.

RELIGION AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

From the vantage point of the United States, today's foreign policy goals are inextricably linked to managing and minimizing the growing threats of religious intolerance and sectarian violence. Yet, tactics often fail to effectively address the multifaceted functions of religion with deadly outcomes. Four years after its invasion, Iraq's neighborhoods are plagued by a bitter sectarian violence that imperils any hope for peace and security in the country and the region. (6) Afghanistan, an American ally in the war on terror, is defined by growing instability and human rights abuses stemming from a continued Taliban presence. (7) In Pakistan, another ally, religious extremists continue to erode stability, threatening the country and region. (8)

Of course, religion's relevance is not limited to current priorities in the Middle East and Central Asia. In Nicaragua and El Salvador, for example, Christian churches played a prominent role within the reformist and revolutionary movements of the 1980s, although the United States largely underestimated and dismissed their influence until it was too late. (9) In the 1990s, religion, ethnicity and nationalism collided with devastating force in the Balkans and today continue to do so in other parts of the world, such as Sri Lanka. (10) In Africa, Christian-Muslim rivalries increase and further threaten the political, economic and social arenas of numerous countries across the continent. (11)

In the face of these realities, there is growing recognition in all circles--policymakers, diplomats, scholars and practitioners--that informed attention must be paid to the role of religion in world affairs. In 1998, the U.S. State Department took an important step by enacting the International Religious Freedom Act, which made the promotion of religious freedom an official priority of foreign policy. (12) The law mandated the publication of an annual report on the status of religious freedom around the world and policy recommendations through a U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom. (13)

By bringing religion to the attention of policymakers, this act focuses on addressing harmful religious issues. It has resulted in some important achievements, including successful negotiations with the Vietnamese government to ban forced renunciations of faith and a recent commitment by the government of Saudi Arabia to revise textbooks that espouse hatred of Jews and Christians. (14) Despite these successes, the act faces significant limitations. Since becoming law almost ten years ago, it has yet to be mainstreamed and integrated among the various U.S. State Department bureaus that shape foreign policy. Internationally, it is misunderstood and mistrusted as another form of U.S. unilateralism. (15) It also remains disproportionately responsible for identifying problems, such as religious persecution and other serious violations, rather than solutions, such as proactively identifying approaches to foster religious tolerance. (16)

Other examples demonstrate that religion is viewed as a negative force. A recent report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies found that when government and military intelligence communities acknowledge religion, their analysis is limited to terrorism and, in particular, the misuse of Islam. "The current focus on extremism has skewed official U.S. policy toward viewing Islam through a threat lens, rather than as a community of actors who may also be able to play a positive role in international relations." (17) Such a view dissuades any meaningful and deeper examination of religion's multifaceted role in the communities to which military and foreign service officers will be deployed, including its potential as a resource for fostering stability and peace.

RELIGION AND CONFLICT IN CURRENT WORLD AFFAIRS

The result is a dangerous gap in knowledge about religion's complex contemporary role, resulting in misguided, shortsighted and ineffective responses to a religiously-diverse world. This incomplete understanding of such a powerful socio-cultural force stems in part from the historical Western assumption that secularism naturally follows modernism, and will eventually catch on across the world as other countries develop. (18) Today, the U.S. tradition of separation between church and state is so central to its national identity that many government officials express discomfort with having anything to do with the topic of religion. (19) Some are unclear on the legal limits of addressing religion, while others continue to dismiss its relevance to foreign policy. (20) However, as Madeleine Albright notes in her recent book, The Mighty and the Almighty, "Religious motivations do not disappear simply because they are not mentioned; more often they lie dormant only to rise up again at the least convenient moment." (21)

Despite the claims of traditional secularization theory; a recent Gallup poll found that two-thirds of the world's population identifies itself as religious. (22) Faith-based groups are forging movements, both peace-seeking and violent, with powerful political impact, including among Buddhists in Myanmar, Hindus in India, Catholics in the Philippines, and Pentecostals in Latin America and Africa. (23) In the United States, religious beliefs frequently influence political votes and decisions. (24) In fact, throughout North America, over 70 percent of the population identifies itself as religious. (25)

With regard to the particular concern discussed in this article, recent studies point to a growing religiosity especially in countries that are unstable and conflict-prone. Where social institutions are weak or government is viewed as illegitimate, faith-based institutions and local religious leaders often play a critical role in meeting the needs of their communities. They carry moral authority; define social values and goals and are often most trusted among the people. (26)

For the United States and much of the world, the events of September 11 serve as a horrific example that action in the name of religion remains a contemporary phenomenon. It became clear that examining both the political and economic spheres is not enough to understanding world dynamics. The role of religion whether construed by a minority to validate bloodshed, or interpreted by the masses to guide their lives and communities with civility and morality--has not diminished.

September 11 also reminds us that Cold War strategies and realist theories, which define conflicts as mainly among nation-states, no longer apply. (27) Today's policymakers and diplomats face tensions and violence that are generally identity-based, drawing upon religious, ethnic and other forms of identity rather than state borders to differentiate the "us versus them." (28) Indeed, the majority of casualties from contemporary wars are not soldiers in battlefields, but civilians in their own neighborhoods--particularly women and children. (29) Hence, in the post-Cold War and, especially, post-September 11 world, those who hold the power to bring peace or wreak havoc do not necessarily hold top political seats, but increasingly are those who are recognized as authentic, trusted and able to influence people's everyday realities.

To take just one example of great concern to U.S. foreign policy, the 2007 Annual Report on International Religious Freedom found that religious freedom in Iraq has sharply deteriorated, despite government efforts to ensure it. The Ambassador-at-Large for International Religious Freedom, John V. Hanford III, explained, "The constitution of the new Iraqi government actually provides rather robust guarantees, and this is something we're very pleased to see because it's a very good constitution for that region of the world. But religious minorities are vulnerable ... people are getting caught in the crossfire ... The real problem that we're dealing with is ... sectarian violence...." (30) Clearly, implementation at the top does not guarantee success in the streets, where the conflict persists for many

Today, the local is global. Tensions and violence at the local level and among non-state actors readily influence the international stage. Interventions must respond to this reality and involve multiple players, especially in local communities. Within the field of conflict resolution, this is not a new idea: Joseph Montville and many others have drawn attention to the importance of unofficial or "Track II" diplomacy, demonstrating that civil society actors perform a key role in conflict resolution and may help to facilitate the actions of official government diplomacy. (31)

It is indeed at the local level, within communities, where one begins to see the complexity of religion as a powerful social force. When asked by a recent Gallup Poll on how to conduct better relations with the Muslim world, the most frequent answer from Muslims was that the West needs to better understand and respect their religion. (32) It is not enough for our policymakers and diplomats to act upon a peripheral understanding of religion, especially a perspective that only focuses on the negative force of religious extremism. Rather, religion's impact in world affairs and the very nature of identity-based conflict today requires that U.S foreign policy be informed of communities' intimate relationships with religion, intertwined with historical, cultural and political contexts at the local level. Therefore, it follows that individuals in civil society who have an in-depth knowledge of these complexities--grassroots religious leaders--are key Track II actors and partners in diplomacy

THE WORK OF LOCAL RELIGIOUS PEACEMAKERS

Northern Ireland

In 1998, the world celebrated as the British and Irish governments signed the Good Friday Agreement in Northern Ireland. (33) After hundreds of years of violence between Catholics and Protestants, the communities developed a strong sense of hope and commitment for peace. (34) What the world did not see was the critical behind-the-scenes roles played by two local religious leaders: the Protestant Reverend Roy Magee and Catholic Father Alex Reid.

Both men were serving their respective communities when the long period of violence and unrest known as the "Troubles" first broke out in the 1960s. The religious leaders watched as victims and perpetrators, paramilitary members and government officials filed into the churches each week. Andy Tyrie, a leader of one of the largest loyalist paramilitary organizations, was also a member of Magee's church. Tyrie asked Magee to speak with his men about spiritual matters. Magee recalls, "In a strange way, I look back and think that God was forging relationships that He could use." (35) Over the following weeks, months and years, Magee pursued this path. He established trusted relationships with these and other paramilitary members and gained what he describes as "the right to tell [these] people that they're wrong." (36) Years later, he talked them into a commitment to the peace process. After the Irish Republican Army (IRA) declared a ceasefire in 1994, Magee immediately took action. Since Magee met with influential loyalists both in prison and on the streets he eventually convinced them to declare a loyalist ceasefire. (37)

Working separately but on a parallel trajectory, Reid's religious role and long-term reputation within his community also allowed him to establish relationships that were instrumental to the peace process. He successfully convinced John Hume, leader of the nationalist Social Democratic and Labour Party (who was later the winner of a Nobel Peace Prize), as well as Gerry Adams, leader of Sinn Fein, the nationalist party historically linked with the IRA, to meet secretly for the first time. A lengthy dialogue ensued. Reid's success in bringing them together has been described as, "arguably the single most important step towards the Good Friday Agreement." (38) He also introduced Adams to Martin Mansergh of Fianna Fail, the political party with the most representation in the Republic of Ireland, initiating another set of critical meetings. At each gathering, he led the men in prayer before leaving the room. (39)

Magee and Reid drew upon their positions as religious leaders to relate to their respective people's sensibilities--a role Magee defines as "nothing more and nothing less than an extension of my pastoral work." (40) As a minister to his community, Magee developed relationships of respect with both the victims and perpetrators of violence, explaining that "even though they may have been ... vicious people and violent people, they have problems. They have difficulties that need to be addressed. And I always left myself open and said to them, don't be afraid to come to me ... [it will] be totally between ourselves." (41) In his own writings, Reid reflected on the calling to engage all sides of the conflict: "Jesus Himself ... communicated directly with those whom He wished to influence, including people who were condemned by the official Church of the time as the worst of the sinners and outlaws. He sat down to the table with them and engaged them in personal dialogue ..." (42) The "pastoral approach of Jesus" that informed the peacemaking work of both Magee and Reid also enabled their communities to trust them and, eventually, view participation in the peace process as aligned with their own principles and goals for their community. (43)

The integrity with which they were regarded, their proximity to the violent realities and their distinct perspectives on the complexity of the conflict allowed Magee and Reid to counsel their communities on how the conflict had less to do with religion than a desire for justice and equality. Reid said, "People thought the IRA were romantic fanatics who were fighting for a united Ireland. While this was important, the whole reality of it was that the Nationalist community was an oppressed community." (44) He understood that many members of the IRA, who attended church and were "the boy next door; the girl next door" were angry not because of their Catholic convictions, but because they did not believe justice could be guaranteed under British rule. (45) Only when they were convinced that equality and their community's ultimate goals could be pursued nonviolently, did they become supporters of the peace process and, eventually, of the Good Friday Agreement itself. (46)

Magee and Reid's years of involvement with all sides of the conflict were fruitful, leading to the Downing Street Declaration and Good Friday Agreement. (47) For those directly involved in the peace process, Magee and Reid's participation was critical. (48) Indeed, Adams said of Reid, "We would not have even the possibility of a peace process if it wasn't for the unstinting, patient, diligent work of a third party. There is no doubt that he was the constant ... in the development of relationships between the key players. He was the key to it and he brought a very special quality to it." (49)

Nigeria

In West Africa, two other men of religion are drawing on their beliefs and practices to manage conflicts between their religious communities. Unlike their counterparts in Northern Ireland, however, Imam Muhammad Ashafa and Pastor James Wuye have not always worked for peace.

Both men grew up in Kaduna, Nigeria, amid deep tensions and devastating violence between Muslims and Christians. As youths, both joined militant religious groups in their respective communities, quickly rising to leadership positions. Relying on religious interpretations and strongly held beliefs, they trained youth to hate and fight other religious communities. In battle, Wuye lost a hand, Ashafa lost two brothers and his spiritual leader; both witnessed significant suffering and destruction. Over time, however, each was moved by the messages of forgiveness and the proscription against killing in their religious traditions. Hesitatingly at first, but today with full commitment, they transformed from religious militants to religious peacemakers. (50) Together, they founded and now lead the Interfaith Mediation Centre, an interreligious organization that guides conflict resolution efforts throughout the country.

Given that an overwhelming majority of Nigerians feel that their faith is more important to their identity than being African, Nigerian or their respective ethnic group identity, Ashata and Wuye draw upon what resonates most with their people: religion. (51) From their youth, Ashafa and Wuye have personal experiences and an understanding of how religious identity can be misconstrued to support violence. James recalls, "We believed that if you kill a Muslim, you are doing something good ... this was justified by Scripture--'Do not get unequally yoked together with unbelievers, for what fellowship has righteousness and lawlessness ...' II Corinthians 6:14." (52) Ashafa similarly says, "I felt that our [Muslim] tradition had been submerged by Western tradition, that our core values had been marginalized. And I could not and did not separate Western culture from Christian culture." (53)

They describe their work today as "reprogramming" the same youth who were once taught how to fight in the name of their religion. Ashafa explains, "Only religion can unite them, because it changed the psyche of the youths who were used as soldiers of destruction." (54) Today, Ashafa and Wuye lead former militants to rebuild the mosques and churches they once destroyed. They also train youth, women, religious leaders and other community members across Nigeria on issues regarding conflict resolution and trauma counseling, basing their lessons on principles within the Bible and Quran--texts with great authority within their communities. (55)

A recent example of their success occurred in 2006, when the cartoons depicting the prophet Muhammad in some European newspapers instigated deadly riots around the world. (56) With its history of interreligious violence, everyone feared that Kaduna would also erupt into communal violence. Ashafa and Wuye took proactive action. They issued a press release and partnered with the local government to publicly state that violence in response to the cartoons was not only against the law, but also against their religious beliefs. (57) What followed stunned many outsiders--the people listened, and Kaduna remained calm. (58)

Iraq

"The reality is that religion has power. And that power can either be used creatively or destructively ... I do believe that religion is indeed the major cause of much conflict in the world today. And I would say if it is a cause, it must also be the cure." (59)

These are the words of Canon Andrew P. B. White, an Anglican peacemaker from the United Kingdom who has spent much of his career in the Middle East. Today known as the "Vicar of Baghdad," White first went to Iraq in 1998, where he established relations with a number of key religious figures. When the war in Iraq began in 2003, he adamantly urged the Coalition Provisional Authority to make interreligious dialogue a priority Their response was not what he had hoped: "I was told Iraq was a secular nation so religion should only be thought about after water and electricity were dealt with." (60) Today, amidst Iraq's devastating sectarian violence, White is working to respond to the repercussions of that decision.

White is CEO and President of the Foundation for Reconciliation in the Middle East, as well as Vicar of the 1,300 member St. George's Anglican Church in Baghdad. Over the years, he has gained the trust and respect of Iraq's diverse religious communities; in fact, the Shia community affectionately call him a "Shia Christian." (61) He meets frequently with Iraqi political and religious leaders, top members of the U.S.-led coalition and local civil society representatives. (62) According to White, the most important step to reducing the violence in Iraq is to "engage with the religious and tribal leaders. We realize that much of the violence and insurgency has religious and tribal background; in fact [it] is instigated by them. And so we're working very hard ... trying to find ways in which we can move forward on the Sunni-Shia engagement." (63) Recently, he organized the first conference for Iraq's top religious leaders, an initiative that took over one year to plan because it was nearly impossible to find a neutral and secure venue. (64)

Similar to Magee and Reid in Northern Ireland, as well as Ashafa and Wuye in Nigeria, White strongly believes that conflict transformation requires reaching both the victims and the perpetrators of violence--even extremists capable of terrorism. In fact, months before the May 2007 failed car bombings in London and Glasgow, White received a cryptic message from an Al-Qaeda leader who forewarned the attacks. (65) He passed along the warning to the British Foreign Office, yet the exact meaning was unclear until after the failed bombings. Still, the incident illustrated White's ability to access pertinent information and key actors (a direct result of his on-the-ground credibility), as well as his belief that peacemaking requires "engagement with all religious and tribal leaders and not just 'the good ones' ... sectarianism can only be addressed by dealing with sects." (66)

Afghanistan

Sakena Yacoobi works at great risk as a religious woman peacemaker in Afghanistan (another country of high priority to U.S. foreign policy). (67) In 1995, around the time the Taliban came to power, Yacoobi founded the Afghan Institute of Learning, through which she ran secret underground schools for women and girls to teach literacy, leadership skills and human rights. All her lessons were based on the Quran. Yacoobi broached taboo subjects, such as rape and domestic abuse, noting how Islam provides key protections for women. It was precisely because her lessons were based on religious teachings that her students accepted them, as did many of their male relatives back home. The women would say to their husbands, "You are a good Muslim, aren't you? Then look: The Quran says that husbands must be fair with their wives." Yacoobi recalls, "Traditionally, men did not want their wives to learn, but now ... they can see the result of the workshops, and they say, 'Islam has taught you this'." (68)

As a trusted religious woman with a deep commitment to her community, Yacoobi reaches individuals who officials and diplomats often cannot access, but who are necessary players in creating a stable Afghanistan. Sakena explains, "People here have become suspicious of one another and have so much revenge to take out to one another. We used sensitivity to culture, tradition and religion to introduce them to our curriculum of peace." (69) Today, the Afghan Institute of Learning has grown to serve over 350,000 women and children throughout Afghanistan, in both rural and urban areas, with education programs, health care and vocational training.

Sierra Leone

In each of the conflicts mentioned so far--Northern Ireland, Nigeria, Iraq and Afghanistan--religion has been defined as at least one of the causes for the conflict. Yet this is not the only context in which local religious leaders can be effective in peacemaking. Take, for example, the work of Alimamy Koroma, a Christian lay leader in Sierra Leone. Throughout Africa, over 90 percent of the population identify themselves as religious. (70) In Sierra Leone, different faith communities have lived side by side in peace for generations; in fact, even within families, relatives may practice different religions. (71) Koroma determined that his country's history of positive interreligious relations was "a solid platform for common action by religious leaders," even though his country's civil war was not defined in religious terms. (72)

After years of conducting relief and rehabilitation work through the Christian Council of Churches, Koroma established the Interreligious Council of Sierra Leone in 1997 with respected leaders from both the Christian and Muslim communities. Because of their status as religious leaders, Koroma and his fellow Council members were considered to be fair and were trusted by the different sides of the conflict, soon gaining the access necessary to mediate between the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and government leaders. According to Koroma, Foday Sankoh, the rebel leader "listened to us and the population had confidence [in us] because I believe we were transparent in our activities." (73) On several occasions, Koroma negotiated the release of child soldiers who had been abducted by the RUE In 1999, he and his Council played an instrumental role as facilitators between the government and rebels in Lomb, Togo, which led to the signing of the Lome Peace Agreement. (74) Their success as Track I1 actors stemmed from their interreligious collaboration and reputation among all sides for being "fair," as well as their proven long-term commitment to their communities, allowing them to play a role in the peace process that secular groups and outsiders could not.

OPENING DOORS FOR CHANGING THE COURSE OF CONFLICT

 If I were secretary of state today, I would not seek to mediate
 disputes on the basis of religious principles any more than I would
 try to negotiate alone the more intricate details of a trade
 agreement or a pact on arms control. In each case, I would ask
 people more expert than I to begin the process of identifying key
 issues, exploring the possibilities, and suggesting a course of
 action ... the outlines would be drawn by those who know every
 nuance of the issues at hand.

--Madeleine Albright, former U.S. Secretary of State (75)

The local peacemakers briefly noted in this article each have personal knowledge of the complex role of religion among the people in their respective communities and the key issues behind the conflicts. They applied this information to establish relationships and programs for successful conflict resolution. In each case, they achieved influence precisely because of their religiosity and their perceived authenticity in communities where religion plays a powerful role. "We are first and foremost religious people," explains Wuye. "With our status as religious leaders, we can go knock on any door. Our peers who are not religious leaders cannot go there." (76)

Although they have access to communities and can knock on doors inaccessible to their secular counterparts, their religious identities only help in getting the doors to open. Indeed, being religious is not enough; not every religious leader is a religious peacemaker and not every leader claiming to work for peace successfully reaches opposing parties and resolves conflicts. What enabled these individuals to be effective was the genuineness of their commitment to the people and their willingness to engage multiple actors and perspectives. Magee was first approached as a reverend in his church, but his success in bringing about a ceasefire came only after years of building relations and recognizing that those associated with deadly violence may also be parents, sons and daughters, wage earners, as well as members of his church. For Reid, building trusted relations with the perpetrators of violence was both critical component of peacemaking and a religious calling, answering the question, "What would the Lord do? He spoke to the sinners, you know? The key to the whole [resolution of the conflict] was to speak with [those inciting the violence]." (77) In Sierra Leone, Koroma's identity as a religious leader positioned him to be seen as a respected, neutral figure. Yet, it was his demonstrated willingness to confront the horrors of conflict--to travel into the bush, to talk with brutal rebel leaders, to maintain patience in frustrating negotiations--that brought the release of child soldiers and convinced both rebel and government leaders to sign the peace accords.

The peacemakers also led by example, especially when drawing upon religious resources for peace instead of conflict. Certainly, Ashafa and Wuye serve as living examples that personal transformation and forgiveness are not only possible but required for peace to be a reality. In her examination of religion and peacebuilding, Cynthia Sampson explains that, "religious traditions establish ethical visions that can summon those who believe in them to powerful forms of committed action ... It is easier for religious figures to talk about repentance and forgiveness--and they are more likely to be viewed as the legitimate actors to do so--than many secular leaders." (78) In Afghanistan under Taliban rule, Yacoobi reached thousands of women and girls by using Islam's principles and traditions to transform the role of religion in their lives from restriction to empowerment. As a woman of faith with a keen knowledge of Islam, she was trusted by her students and accepted by their families, giving her legitimacy at a time of great mistrust and fear.

According to Madeleine Albright, U.S. foreign policy should draw upon the data produced by those who understand "every nuance of the issues at hand," to suggest a prudent course of action. (79) Certainly, White's years of on-the-ground peacemaking work in the Middle East, together with his eagerness to build relations with and among various religious actors, has given him insight into the complex role of religion in Iraq. Likewise, Isaac inherently understood the authority and respect afforded to eldership in his Ethiopian tradition and he knew how to tap into that resource by creating highly successful networks of interreligious elder mediators. In Northern Ireland, Reid's expertise directly informed the peace process at the highest levels; in fact, he wrote a series of position papers that foresaw the actions necessary. (80) According to Martin Mansergh of Fianna Fail, his 1987 paper, "was a remarkably prescient document ... It anticipated ... part of the [Good Friday] Agreement ... the unspoken premise of the entire paper was an understanding that an IRA ceasefire was necessary for all-party talks to take place." (81) Seven years later, Reid's behind-the-scenes mediations proved critical to convincing the IRA of the ceasefire.

Although some of the conflicts cited in this article have officially ended, the peacemakers' work has not. For them, peace is not just the cessation of war, but a state in which the dignity of their people has been restored and their communities can prosper. According to John Paul Lederach, "to be at all germane to contemporary conflict ... [we need to move] away from a concern with the resolution of issues and toward a frame of reference that focuses on the restoration and rebuilding of relationships." (82)

The local religious leaders in this article each understand peacemaking work as more than just convincing key actors to sign an agreement. 'After the atrocities and destruction of civil society," Koroma says, "people are crying out for a plan that goes beyond UN peacekeeping ... We intend to train ourselves and our fellow caregivers so they can go and provide trauma healing in a way that encourages the kind of restorative justice that permits true reconciliation and supports sustainable peace." (83) Today, Koroma leads programs for the most vulnerable in his country, including former child soldiers, sexually abused children, those with HIV/MDS and Liberian women refugees. In Nigeria, Ashafa and Wuye train ex-militants and others throughout the country in conflict management so that they are prepared when tensions inevitably arise.

Isaac continues to play the role of a trusted religious elder, ready to respond whenever there is conflict in Ethiopia, as exemplified by his most recent negotiations that led to the release of opposition leaders. In Northern Ireland, Magee continued his work to ease tensions among loyalist groups and within his Protestant community long after the Good Friday Agreement. Today, Reid travels between Northern Ireland and the Basque region of Spain, where he has brought his religious peacemaking expertise to a new conflict and has again been instrumental in bringing about a ceasefire, this time that of the Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) in 2006. (84) Although it was eventually called off, he persists, trying to sustain a cessation of violence. The conflict in Iraq has not ended, of course, but White is engaging the leaders of all religions, recognizing that the violence tearing apart the country will not end until these leaders demonstrate a willingness to reconcile and live in peace as neighbors. "As a believer in education," Yacoobi states, "I think education is the key to civilization, health and escaping poverty I would like Afghanistan to completely, successfully master its attitude toward education and for all to be healthy." (85) Through her Afghan Institute of Learning, she is giving her people an opportunity for such a future.

RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION

The local religious leaders recognized in this article are successful precisely because they have the credibility and the competence to address the challenging realities that the United States now confronts around the world. Indeed, they bring two key skills to the table that are critical in today's foreign policy: a distinct ability to address the complex role of religion and a practical on-the-ground understanding of the nature of conflict among the people. As such, they have the knowledge and authority to take action and move communities toward peace. When coupled with a long-term commitment, they are a potent resource.

There are several ways in which U.S. foreign policy goals can be furthered by these peacemakers. However, these require a deliberate refocusing of perspective and a readiness to more holistically engage the issue of religion. The first step in this process is to acknowledge the powerful role that religious peacemakers can play, and then to pay more attention to them. The U.S. government must ensure that its approach to conflict includes examining the ways in which religious resources, knowledge and identity are available to advance peace processes. Foreign service officers need to learn how to identify religious peacemakers from among a community's religious actors and then actively engage these men and women by understanding what they do, when to consult them and, if appropriate, how to draw them to the tables of diplomacy.

This requires proper training before being deployed overseas, especially regarding the religious dynamics of the communities in which they will be stationed and the breadth of the work done by local peace-seeking religious leaders in Track II diplomacy In fact, the Center for Strategic and International Studies specifically recommends Peacemakers in Action: Profiles of Religion in Conflict Resolution as a resource for the curriculum of the Foreign Service Institute and military training institutes. (86) This book shares the in-depth stories of seven religious peacemakers discussed in this article as well as nine more, and analyzes and compares their unique religious peacemaking techniques.

A second way to strengthen foreign policy and security goals is to ensure that local religious peacemakers have the safe space they need to do their work. This calls for sensitivity on the part of U.S. government officials and must be addressed in training on the subject. The key to working with them and successfully tapping into their expertise and skills is to avoid compromising their efforts and credibility The peacemakers in this article all work at significant risk to their lives. Some intentionally stay away from the limelight to increase their effectiveness--consider Reid's secret meetings with John Hume and Gerry Adams or Yacoobi's underground classes for women and girls. Others intentionally expose some aspects of their work to the public while withholding the rest, such as White and his ongoing dialogue with various religious and political leaders in Iraq. Thus, it is important for U.S. government officials to both learn how to identify true religious peacemakers and collaborate with them in ways that allow the local peacemakers to define the parameters of their relationship and how public they want the partnership to be. This is particularly important given the negative perception of the United States in communities around the world.

Finally, the U.S. government should implement more initiatives to assist the work of local clergy and lay leaders working for peace. Although some support is given to faith-based groups, additional programs should pay particular attention to the role of religious peacemakers, specifically in conflict resolution, by ensuring that they have necessary technology, training and other resources. Many local religious leaders who engage in peacemaking work, including all of those mentioned in this article, received little formal instruction in conflict resolution before starting their efforts. Opportunities for resources and trainings are important to strengthen the impact of such vital actors. Further, a small number of universities and seminaries in the United States and abroad are offering programs in religion and conflict resolution, but more are needed. (87) It is critical that our next generation of diplomats and religious leaders be armed with this knowledge before embarking on careers in an evolving and religiously-diverse world.

This article does not suggest that religious peacemakers are the answer to creating peace. Nor does it suggest that all religious leaders are religious peacemakers. Rather, it urges recognition of religious peacemakers as a subset of the Track II community and as an underutilized resource. Without question, the U.S. government may significantly advance its international priorities by turning its attention to local religious peacemakers and supporting their efforts as key partners and participants in diplomacy. The individuals exampled here demonstrate their capacity for addressing religion and contemporary conflicts in world affairs; their successes demand our attention and support. Anything less puts the realization of U.S. foreign policy goals--security at home and abroad--at continued risk.

NOTES

(l) Ernie Regehr, "War after the Cold War: Shaping a Canadian Response," Project Ploughshares Working Paper 934, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, Conrad Grebel College (Waterloo, Ontario: 1993); Paul C. Stern and Daniel Druckman, International Conflict Resolution After the Cold War (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 2000); and Peter Wallensteen and Margareta Sollenberg, "Armed Conflicts, Conflict Transformation and Peace Agreements, 1989-96," Journal of Peace Research 34 (1997), 339-359.

(2) The Tanenbaum Center for Interreligious Understanding is a not-for-profit, nonsectarian organization dedicated to providing practical programs that prevent the urgent and growing problem of verbal and physical conflicts based on religion. Tanenbaum works to change behavior in religious diverse settings including schools, workplaces, healthcare settings and areas of armed conflict. See http://www.tanenbaum.org/.

(3) David Little, ed., with Tanenbaum Center for Interreligious Understanding, Peacemakers in Action: Profiles of Religion in Conflict Resolution (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007); David R. Smock, Religious Contributions to Peacemaking: When Religion Brings Peace, Not War (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, January 2006).

(4) Mohammad Abu-Nimer, Tsjeard Bouta and S. Ayse Kadayifci-Orellana, Faith-Based Peacebuilding: Mapping and Analysis of Christian, Muslim and Multi-Faith Actors (Washington, DC: Netherlands Institute of International Relations in cooperation with Salaam Institute for Peace and Justice, November 2005); Andrea Bartoli, "Mediating Peace in Mozambique: The Role of the Community of Sant'Egidio," in Herding Cats: Multi-Party Mediation in a Complex World, eds. Pamela Aall, Chester Crocker and Fen Hampson (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1999), 245-274; Harold Coward and Gordan S. Smith, eds., Religion and Peacebuildlng (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2004); Marc Gopin, Holy War, Holy Peace: How World Religion Can Bring Peace to the Middle East (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002); Douglas Johnston and Cynthia Sampson, eds, Religion: The Missing Dimension oF Statecraft (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994); and Cynthia Sampson and John Paul Lederach, From the Ground Up: Mennonite Contributions to International Peacebuilding (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000).

(5) David Little, ed., with Tanenbaum Center for Interreligious Understanding, Peacemakers in Action: Profiles of Religion in Conflict Resolution (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

(6) Vali Nasr, "When the Shiites Rise," Foreign Affairs (July/August 2006).

(7) Amnesty International Press Release, "Afghanistan: Taleban attacks against civilians increasing and systematic" (19 April 2007).

(8) International Crisis Group, The State of Sectarianism in Pakistan, Asia Report 95 (18 April 2005).

(9) Barry Rubin, "Religion and International Affairs," in Religion: The Missing Dimension of Statecraft, eds., Douglas Johnston and Cynthia Sampson (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 20-34; Phillip Berryman "Church and Revolution," NACLA Report on the Americas (March/April 1997), http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/40/023.html.

(10) David Little and Donald K. Swearer, eds., Religion and Nationalism in Iraq: A Comparative Perspective (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006).

(11) Rabiatu Ammah, "Christian-Muslim Relations in Contemporary Sub-Saharan Africa," Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations 18, no. 2 (April 2007), 139-153; Madeleine Albright, The Mighty and the Almighty: Reflections on America, God, and World Affairs (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2006), 251-264.

(12) International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, Section 2b.

(13) Ibid., Section 102 and 202, respectively.

(14) John V. Hanford III, "International Religious Freedom: Religion and International Diplomacy" (panel discussion, Pew Research Center, Washington, DC: 8 May 2007), http://pewforum.org/events/?EventID=139.

(15) John Shattuck, "International Religious Freedom: Religion and International Diplomacy" (panel discussion, Pew Research Center, Washington, DC: 8 May 2007), http://pewforum.org/ events/?EventID=139.

(16) Liora Danan, Mixed Blessings: U.S. Government Engagement with Religion in Conflict-Prone Settings (Washington, DC: The Center for Strategic and International Studies Press, 2007), 13-14.

(17) Ibid., 41; 21-25.

(18) C. Wright Mills said: "After the Reformation and the Renaissance, the forces of modernization swept across the globe and secularization, a corollary historical process, loosened the dominance of the sacred. In due course, the sacred shall disappear altogether except, possibly, in the private realm," The Sociological Imagination (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1959), 32-33. In recent years, many scholars have reexamined and challenged traditional secularization theory and its thesis linking the secularization of society to its modernity, including: Peter Ludwig Berger, ed., The Desecularization of the World: Resurgent Religion and World Politics (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Win. B. Eerdmans Publishing, 1999); Jose Casanova, Public Religions in the Modern World (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994); and David Martin, On Secularization: Towards a Revised General Theory (London: Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2005). For a recent discussion, see Mark Lilla, "The Politics of God" in New York Times Magazine, 19 August 2007, Section 6.

(19) In the words of Ambassador John Hanford, "There is a concern--I see as excessive--about the separation of Church and State that has led to a lack of comfort in dealing with religion," as appears in Liora Danan, "Mixed Blessings: U.S. Government Engagement with Religion in Conflict-Prone Settings" (CSIS Report, CSIS, Washington, DC: August 2007), 39.

(20) The Center for Strategic and International Studies found that "some government officials said they are sensitive about approaching religion because they fear being personally attacked--via litigation or public opprobrium--for possibly violating the Establishment Clause." Ibid., 39-40.

(21) Albright.

(22) GALLUP International Press Release, "Voices of the People 2005: Religiosity Around the World" (16 November 2005).

(23) Timothy Samuel Shah and Monica Duffy Toft, "Why God is Winning," Dallas Morning News, 16 July 2006.

(24) John C. Green, "Religion and the Presidential Vote: A Tale of Two Gaps" (The Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, 21 August 2007); Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, "Religion: A Strength and Weakness for Both Parties," Survey Reports (30 August 2005).

(25) GALLUP International Press Release, "Religion in the world at the end of the millennium."

(26) Rubin, 28; Cynthia Sampson, "Religion and Peacebuilding" in Peacemaking in International Conflict: Methods and Techniques, eds., I. William Zartman and J. Lewis Rasmussen (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997), 275.

(27) J. Lewis Rasmussen, "Peacemaking in the Twenty-First Century: New Rules, New Roles, New Actors," in Peacemaking in International Conflict: Methods and Techniques, eds., I. William Zartman and J. Lewis Rasmussen (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997), 24-27.

(28) Wallensteen and Sollenberg.

(29) J. Grant, The State of the World's Children (UNICEF, New York: 1992).

(30) John V. Hanford III, Release of the Department of State's Annual Report on International Religious Freedom (U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC: 14 September 2007).

(31) Joseph V. Montville and William D. Davidson, "Foreign Policy According to Freud," Foreign Policy (Winter 1981-1982), 145-157; also see Louis Kriesberg, "The Development of the Conflict Resolution Field" in Peacemaking in International Conflict: Methods and Techniques, eds., I. William Zartman and J. Lewis Rasmussen (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997), 51-77; and John W. McDonald, "Further Exploration of Track Two Diplomacy," in Timing the De-Escalation of International Conflicts, eds., Louis Kriesberg and Stuart J. Thorson (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1991), 201-220.

(32) John L. Esposito, "Muslims and the West: A Culture War?" (The Gallup Poll, 13 February 2006).

(33) Also known as the Belfast Agreement (Belfast, Northern Ireland: 10 April 1998).

(34) The Normans of England invaded the Iberian Celts in Ireland in 1169, planting the seeds for centuries of tensions and, at times, violent conflict on the island. The Protestant Reformation of the 16th century, which succeeded after much bloodshed in bringing most of Catholic Ireland under Protestant English control, was another significant event in the history of the Northern Ireland conflict. See Mike Cronin, A History of Ireland (London: Palgrave Press, 2001); and Peter Fry and Fiona Somerset Fry, A History of Ireland (Oxford: Routledge, 1991).

(35) Roy Magee, fax message to Tanenbaum Center for Interreligious Understanding, 3 September 2003; Little (2007), 62.

(36) Roy Magee, interview by Tanenbaum 5 May 1999, Belfast, Northern Ireland; and Little (2007), 62.

(37) Jane Bardon, "The Minister Who Offers to Mediate," BBC News, 22 August 2000.

(38) John Mullins, "Figure of Peace Stays in Shadows," Guardian, 9 December 1998.

(39) Gerry Adams, A Farther Shore: Ireland's Long Road to Peace (New York: Random House, 2003), 43.

(40) Bardon, 2000.

(41) Magee, interview.

(42) Alex Reid, "The Conflict in Northern Ireland"(unpublished paper, 1989).

(43) Ibid.

(44) Alex Reid, "Peacemakers in Action Retreat" (lecture, Tanenbaum Retreat, Amman, Jordan: 4 May 2004).

(45) Alex Reid, interview by Tanenbaum 5 May 1999, Belfast, Northern Ireland.

(46) Alex Reid, lecture.

(47) "Decommission Witnesses in Profile," BBC News, 26 September 2005.

(48) Little (2007), 79.

(49) Brian Rowan, Behind the Lines: The Story of the IRA and Loyalist Ceasefires (Belfast: Blackstaff Press, 1995), 165.

(50) For more about the events that led to and followed their transformations, see Little (2007), 261-64.

(51) A recent poll showed that 91 percent of Muslims and 76 percent of Christians in Nigeria feel that religion is more important to their identity than than their continental, national or ethnic identification. See Robert Ruby and Timothy Samuel Shah, "Nigeria's Presidential Election: The Christian-Muslim Divide," The Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life, 21 March 2007, http://pewresearch.org/pubs/435/nigeria-presidential-election.

(52) James Wuye, interview by Tanenbaum, Kaduna, Nigeria, September 2000.

(53) Muhammad Ashafa, interview by Tanenbaum, Koduna, Nigeria, September 2000.

(54) Ibid.

(55) Muhammad Ashafa and James Wuye, The Pastor and the 1mare--Responding to Conflict (Lagos, Nigeria: Ibrash Press, 1999).

(56) John Ward Anderson, "Cartoons of Prophet Met with Outrage," Washington Post, 31 January 2006, A12; "70,000 gather for violent Pakistan cartoons protest," Times Online, 15 February 2006, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article731005.ece; and "Protestors burn consulate over cartoons," CNN.com, 5 February 2006.

(57) Little (2007), 273.

(58) Paul Wee, "Responding to Crisis in Nigeria" (USIPeace Briefing, United States Institute of Peace, April 2006).

(59) Andrew P. B. White, discussion session, Tanenbaum Peacemakers in Action Retreat, New York: 2005.

(60) Andrew P. B. White, phone interview by Tanenbaum, 19 March 2005.

(61) Andrew P. B. White, interview by Tanenbaum, Washington, DC, 3 May 2007.

(62) Joanna Sugden, "Profile: Canon Andrew White," Times Online, 4 July 2007; "Iraqi Religious Leaders Call for an End to Violence, Militias and Terrorism," The Foundation for Relief and Reconciliation in the Middle East, August 2007; and Andrew P. B. White, "Iraqi Religious Leaders' Congress," The Foundation for Relief and Reconciliation in the Middle East.

(63) Andrew P. B. White, interview by Bob Abernethy, Religion & Ethics Newsweekly, PBS, 4 May 2007, http://www.pbs.org/wnet/religionandethics/week1036/perspectives.html.

(64) "Iraqi Religious Leaders Call for an End to Violence, Militias and Terrorism," The Foundation for Relief and Reconciliation in the Middle East; Andrew P. B. White, "Iraqi Religious Leaders' Congress."

(65) Associated Press, "U.K. cleric says al-Qaida warned him of attacks," MSNBC.com, 4 July 2007.

(66) Andrew P. B. White, interview by Tanenbaum, Washington, DC, 3 May 2007.

(67) Little (2007), 382.

(68) Sakena Yacoobi, phone interview by Tanenbaum, 17 October 2003.

(69) Ibid.

(70) GALLUP International Press Release.

(71) Jane Lampman, "Faith's Unbreakable Force," Christian Science Monitor, 23 December 1999, http://www.csmonitor.com/1999/1223/p1lsl.html.

(72) Alimamy P. Koroma, e-mail message to Tanenbaum, 21 May 2000; "This civil war wasn't caused by a political vision or for religious reasons or for ethnic reasons. Not that that excuses war crimes or crimes against humanity. This was done for pure greed. This was done to control a commodity, and that commodity was diamonds," Tom Crane, interview by Bob Abernethy, Religion & Ethics Newsweekly, PBS, 10 January 2003.

(73) Alimamy P. Koroma, interview with Tanenbaum, 12 December 2003.

(74) Thomas Mark Turay, "Civil society and peacebuilding: the role of the Interreligious Council of Sierra Leone," Accord, September 2000, http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accorddsierra-leone/ interreligiouscouncil.php.

(75) Albright, 75.

(76) James Wuye, interview by Tanenbaum, Kaduna, Nigeria, September 2000.

(77) Reid, interview.

(78) Sampson, 275-276.

(79) Albright, 75.

(80) Peacemaker/WPI awardees announcement, http://www.tanenbaum.org/peacemaker_awardees.html.

(81) Martin Mansergh, "The Early Stages of the Irish Peace Process," Accord 8 (1994).

(82) John Paul Lederach, Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press: 1997), 24.

(83) Church World Service News Release, "Sierra Leone to Host Seminars on Trauma Awareness and Recovery," 9 January 2004.

(84) "Priest involved in Eta peace move," BBC News, 22 March 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/northern_ireland/4835314.stm.

(85) Yacoobi, interview.

(86) Little (2007); Danan, 50.

(87) For a few examples, see the Center for World Religions, Diplomacy and Conflict Resolution at George Mason University; the Program in Religion, Conflict and Peacebuilding at the Joan B. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame; the Center for Justice and Peacebuilding at Eastern Mennonite University; and trainings and short courses on the topic at the United Nations affiliated University for Peace.