文章基本信息

标题：A theory of stability in many-to-many matching markets
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作者：Echenique, Federico ; Oviedo, Jorge
期刊名称：Theoretical Economics
印刷版ISSN：1555-7561
出版年度：2006
卷号：1
期号：2
页码：233-273
出版社：Econometric Society
摘要：We develop a theory of stability in many-to-many matching markets. We give conditions under which the setwise-stable set, a core-like concept, is nonempty and can be approached through an algorithm. The usual core may be empty. The setwise-stable set coincides with the pairwise-stable set and with the predictions of a non-cooperative bargaining model. The setwise-stable set possesses the conflict/coincidence of interest properties from many-to-one, and one-to-one models. The theory parallels the standard theory of stability for many-to-one, and one-to-one, models. We provide results for a number of core-like solutions, besides the setwise-stable set.
关键词：Two-sided matching; cooperative game theory; core