文章基本信息

标题：Why a Logic is not only its Set of Valid Inferences
本地全文：下载
作者：Eduardo A. Barrio ; Eduardo A. Barrio ; Federico Pailos 等
期刊名称：Análisis filosófico
印刷版ISSN：1851-9636
出版年度：2021
卷号：41
期号：2
页码：261-272
DOI：10.36446/af.2021.461
语种：Spanish
出版社：Sociedad Argentina de Análisis Filosófico
摘要：The main idea that we want to defend in this paper is that the question of what a logic is should be addressed differently when structural properties enter the game. In particular, we want to support the idea according to which it is not enough to identify the set of valid inferences to characterize a logic. In other words, we will argue that two logical theories could identify the same set of validities (e.g. its logical truths and valid inferences), but not be the same logic.