文章基本信息

标题：Wittgenstein, McDowell y el reto escéptico
本地全文：下载
作者：María Teresa Muñoz Sánchez
期刊名称：Revista de Filosofía (Madrid)
印刷版ISSN：1988-284X
出版年度：2013
卷号：38
期号：2
页码：7-34
DOI：10.5209/rev_RESF.2013.v38.n2.43386
语种：Spanish
出版社：Servicio de Publicaciones de la Universidad Complutense de Madrid
摘要：In this article the following thesis is defended: Wittgenstein “exorcises” skeptical arguments by showing a conception of language and knowledge which has come to be characterized as naturalism and quietism. And this article distinguishes between Wittgensteinian quietist and naturalistic approaches, on the one hand, and McDowell’s own naturalism, the minimal empiricism, on the other. Unlike the latter, the Wittgensteinian proposal offers us the possibility of rejecting the skeptical challenge.
其他摘要：In this article the following thesis is defended: Wittgenstein “exorcises” skeptical arguments by showing a conception of language and knowledge which has come to be characterized as naturalism and quietism. And this article distinguishes between Wittgensteinian quietist and naturalistic approaches, on the one hand, and McDowell’s own naturalism, the minimal empiricism, on the other. Unlike the latter, the Wittgensteinian proposal offers us the possibility of rejecting the skeptical challenge.
关键词：naturalismo;quietismo;escepticismo;empirismo
其他关键词：quietism;skepticism;empiricism and naturalism